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Public Interest Litigation in a
Comparative Context
Jayanth Kumar Krishnan*
INTRODUCTION
Scholarship on interest group litigation in the United States
is well documented. Some observers focus on the filing of lawsuits
by interest groups.' Others examine amicus brief submissions by
groups.2 Still others look at, among other things, whether and why
interest groups participate in class action cases.3 The recent wave
of writings on interest group litigation is not restricted to simply
the United States. In places such as Canada, 4 Britain,5 the Nether-
Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul,
MN. B.A., J.D., Ohio State University; M.A., Ph.D., University of
Wisconsin-Madison. For their comments, feedback, and advice, I would
like to thank Bert Kritzer, Marc Galanter, Chuck Epp, Marcia Gelpe,
Frances Raday, Yoav Dotan, and Yael Yishai. For the institutional support I
received, I would like to thank the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the
Hebrew University Law Faculty, and the Tel Aviv University Law Faculty.
This study was funded by grants from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, the Council for American Overseas Research Committee, and the
Joint Center of International Studies.
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & C.K. Rowland, Debunking the Myth of Interest
Group Invincibility in the Courts, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 205 (1991); LEE
EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 68 (1985).
2 See, e.g., James Spriggs & Paul Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of
Information at the Supreme Court, 50 POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
365 (1997).
3 See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele & Jack L. Walker, The Litigation Strategies
of Interest Groups, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA 180-81
(Jack L. Walker, ed., 1991) [hereinafter Scheppele & Walker, Litigation
Strategies].
4 See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS,
ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 171-96
(1998) [hereinafter EPP, RIGHTS REVOLUTION]; Charles R. Epp, Do Bills of
Rights Matter: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 70 AM.
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lands,6 and Israel,7 scholars note that organized interests are using
the courts to further their public policy goals.
But what actually affects whether or not interest groups use
this tactic of litigation as a technique to achieve. policy objectives?
Traditionally, two explanations have been offered to answer this
question. One explanation suggests that the degree of institutional
accessibility to courts affects whether or not groups will use
litigation as a public policy tactic. 8 Supporters of this argument
often point to the United States, where during the 1960's and
1970's, the federal judiciary broadened the concept of standing to
provide more organizations with greater accessibility to the
courts.9 The passage of certain federal and state laws during this
time also removed several institutional obstacles that groups had
historically faced when filing cases in court. These new laws, for
example, made it easier for groups to sue and collect costs from the
government for infringing on their constitutional rights.' 0
POL. SC. REV. 766 (1966); F.L. MORTON, PRO-CHOICE V. PRO-LIFE:
ABORTION POLITICS AND THE COURTS IN CANADA 220-21 (1993).
s See e.g., EPP, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 140-42.
6 See e.g., Susan Olson, Comparing Women's Rights Litigation in the
Netherlands and the United States, 28 POLITY 189 (1995).
7 See e.g., Yoav Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human
Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice During the Intifiada,
33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 319 (1999) (discussing, in particular, the litigation
patterns of the Palestinian movement).
9 Scheppele & Walker, supra note 3, at 165.
9 See e.g., STEPHAN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 172 (4th ed. 1993); RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW
64 (1995); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 212-17 (3' ed. 1993) (discussing how the Warren
Court expanded standing requirements while the Burger Court limited
standing in certain cases); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY,
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 373-76 (1986). For
case law that observers often point to see, Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (broadening standing
requirements to sue); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971) (allowing public interest groups to use federal legislation to
challenge the activities ofa federal agency).
10 See EPp, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 60-61 (included among
these statutes were the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights
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A second common explanation is referred to as the
resource-based theory. This alternative perspective states that it is
group-resources that primarily affect whether or not litigation is
selected."' Again, the United States is frequently cited as support
for this argument; the use of litigation by American groups has
been shown to vary depending on the availability of resources.' 2
In this article, I test the robustness of these two theories on
an environment where interest group litigation is a relatively recent
phenomenon. I use Israel as my empirical case study. Since the
1980's, many different types of Israeli interest groups have sought
to redress their grievances in front of the country's highest court.13
One possible explanation for why this has occurred is because
during the 1980's the Israeli Supreme Court liberalized the require-
ments for gaining standing as a petitioner. 14 In addition, the costs
for using litigation in Israel have remained relatively low during
the past twenty years. 15 And, a number of Israeli interest groups
Attorneys' Fees Award Act of 1976); See also Robert v. Percival &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest
Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.. PROBS. 233 (1984). Compare Buckhannon
Board & Care Home v. West Virginia, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), (recently
holding that plaintiffs suing under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988 and the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 must actually be a
"prevailing party" before their attorneys may collect fees from the opposing
side).
:21 Scheppele & Walker, supra note 3, at 176, 181.
12 FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BETH LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE
IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 143
(1998).
13 Yoav Dotan, Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead? Resource Inequalities
in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice, 33
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 1059, 1063-64 (1998).
'4 See, H.C. 217/80, Segal v. Minister of Interior, , 34 (4) P.D. 429, 443
(acknowledging the standing of public petitioners in environmental cases);
H.C. 1/81, Shiran v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority, 35 P.D. 365
(acknowledging that emotional injury may be a basis for standing); H.C.
910/86, Ressler v. Minister of Defense,, 42 (2) P.D. 441.
15 Dotan, supra note 7, at 323.
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since the 1980's have also seen a growth in resources.' 6These
resources most notably are from contributions made by the New
Israel Fund, a non-governmental organization known for donating
various types of resources to diverse social and political groups.,
7
Perhaps then it is only intuitive to believe that the rise in Israeli
litigation rates by interest groups is a result of favorable
institutional conditions and increased resources.' 8
As I demonstrate, however, greater access to courts and
resources are not the only factors that affect whether or not Israeli
interest organizations litigate. Indeed both institutional factors and
resources may matter, but as I show there are other elements that
are as (if not more) important to the decision-making calculations
of interest group policy makers. Whether or not organizations opt
for litigation depends upon what I call a set or taxonomy of interest
group leadership goals. These goals of interest group leaders
(which I discuss in detail below) are oftentimes subtle and multi-
dimensional in nature. The empirical evidence I provide on Israel
adds a new perspective to the growing literature on legal
mobilization. This article is divided into five parts. Part I begins
by detailing how interest groups in general have evolved within the
Israeli political system. In this section I give a brief historical
16 Interview with (identity of official protected upon request), high ranking
official, New Israel Fund, in Jerusalem, Israel (Sept. 7, 1998) . See also,
New Israel Fund, at http://www.nif.org.
17 id.
18 For this article I focus on only one dimension of litigation, that being
lawsuit participation. (The study defines lawsuit participation in the manner
typically found in the interest group literature. A group is a lawsuit
participant when: it files suit on behalf of its own members; represents an
outside party; and/or hires an outside party to represent it in court). The
reason for selecting lawsuit participation is because while the sponsorship
of cases and the submission of amicus briefs are not uncommon to
American interest groups that litigate, many Israeli attorneys told me that
the same is not true of Israeli interest groups. Lawsuit - or what is
oftentimes referred to as petition - participation by Israeli interest groups
remains the main form of judicial participation. Throughout the course of
the article, I use the terms lawsuit participation and litigation
interchangeably.
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overview and explain the context within which interest groups
operate in Israel. Part II then provides an in-depth discussion of the
three types of interest groups examined in this study: women's
groups, environmental groups, and civil liberties groups.
Additionally in this section, I offer a methodological explanation
for how and why I select such "public" interest groups as my foci
of analysis. In part III I discuss the various tactics these Israeli
public interest groups employ when pursuing their policy goals. As
I show, litigation is a tactic used by only a minority of organiza-
tions within the country.
In part IV I turn my attention to examining specifically the
litigiously oriented groups in more detail. During this portion of
the discussion I attempt to understand what factors affect when
groups will and will not use the courts for public policy purposes. I
present the two standard theoretical explanations and subsequently
outline my set of hypotheses. I then use both qualitative and
quantitative techniques to test the alternative theories on the
empirical evidence I gathered during several extended research
visits to Israel between 1998-2000. I present my findings and
demonstrate that while the two standard explanations (the institu-
tional theory and the resource-based theory) may be necessary for
understanding the conditions under which groups litigate, they are
not sufficient. With the addition of my leadership goals thesis we
are better able to appreciate when groups will and will not turn to
the judicial process.
Part V provides concluding thoughts on what the study's
implications are for the field of public interest law, not just in
Israel but also elsewhere, particularly the United States. The fact
that the two standard theories used to explain organizational
litigation in the United States do not apply fully when looking at
Israel suggests perhaps that scholars of American law may need to
reconsider what factors affect whether groups use courts for social
policy purposes.
2001-2002
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTEREST GROUPS
WITHIN A PARTY-DOMINATED STATE
Despite some changes over the past few years, Israel
remains a state that is highly centralized and party-dominated. 19
Parties in Israel control the legislative and bureaucratic branches of
government, and as a consequence, control the distribution of
social services as well.2 ° Parties serve as the main organizations
that represent political interests; thus parties (rather than groups)
are used as the vehicles for political mobilization.2' Parties also set
much of the political agenda for the country, and the ruling party,
in particular, frequently determines the degree of salience given to
an issue.22 In addition, parties are present at almost every access
point of influence in the political system. As one observer notes,
parties are so deeply embedded both institutionally and culturally
that most "native Israelis... [are] born into political parties. 23
With parties wielding such power and influence in Israel, it
is hard to image how there exists any political space for interest
groups to operate, let alone for them to litigate. But while the
environment is certainly "compressed," 24 it is incorrect to assert
that no interest organizations are present. One powerful workers'
organization that plays a major role in Israeli politics today, the
Histradut, dates back to the pre-state period.2 There are other
19 ASHER ARIAN, THE SECOND REPUBLIC: POLITICS IN ISRAEL 282 (1998)
[hereinafter ARIAN, SECOND REPUBLIC]; ASHER ARIAN, POLITICS IN ISRAEL
206 (1989) [hereinafter ARIAN, SECOND GENERATION].
20 YAEL YISHAI, LAND OF PARADOXES: INTEREST POLITICS IN ISRAEL 32
(1991) [hereinafter YISHAI, LAND OF PARADOXES].
21 1. GALNOOR, STEERING THE POLITY: COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICS IN
ISRAEL 74-77, 163-64. (1982).
22 ARIAN, SECOND REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 141; ARIAN, SECOND
GENERATION, supra note 19, at 283.
23 Deborah Sontag, In Close Israeli Race, Russian Voters Hold the Key, NEW
YORK TIMES, May 12, 1999, at A3.
24 Asher Arian, Israel: Interest Group Pluralism Constrained, in FIRST WORLD
INTEREST GROUPS, 190 (Clive Thomas, ed., 1993).
25 ARIAN, SECOND REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 300. See generally MARCIA
DREZON-TEPLER, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL CAHNGE IN ISRAEL 26
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associations that have long histories in Israeli politics as well. For
example, groups interested in issues of security and defense,
agriculture, and religion have existed in the country for many
years.26
Being an interest group that exists in Israel is one thing;
being a group that affects public policy, however, is quite another.
Because of both the omnipresence and omnipotence of parties in
Israel, a group has historically needed to patronize or align itself to
ideologically similar parties, if it hopes to impact government
decision-making.27 As Asher Arian notes:
Independent groups that organize to influence policy
are generally short-lived and unsuccessful unless
coopted by some party-affiliated or government-
affiliated group. More important, in the Israeli
system the number of groups proves nothing because
of their extreme inequality in terms of power. Power
in the system is in the hands of leaders of the party
or parties in the government coalition.
28
Effectively, then, group-success in affecting policy-
outcomes has depended upon the types of relationships groups
have with party-elites. But are groups as dependent on parties
today to advance their interests as in years past? Furthermore, do
groups remain primarily organized around issues relating to
workers' rights, agriculture, security, and religion?
(1990). The Histradut is an organization that formed in 1920. It is the
umbrella organization for workers' unions throughout the country, which
represents approximately 650,000 workers. The leadership was directly
affiliated with the Mapai (and then later) Labor Party until 1994. After
1994, a splinter group of Labor took control of the Histradut.
26 For an insightful discussion on defense, labor, agriculture, and religious
groups in Israel, see ARIAN, SECOND REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 290-323;
see also, Yael Yishai, Civil Society in Transition, 555 THE ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 147, 150 (1998)
[hereinafter Yishai, Civil Society].
27 YISHAI, , supra note 20, at 133-34.
28 ARAN, SECOND REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 289.
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During the period from 1948 to the middle 1960's interest
groups were defined by'and worked closely in conjunction with
political parties. Political parties during this time, in particular the
political party of Mapai, controlled the state to such an extent that
it was often difficult to determine the lines that divided the ruling
party from the state.29 Interest groups that wished to achieve
particular goals were completely dependent upon Mapai. Mapai
determined which interests received state attention and which
interests did not. Groups such as the Histradut, farmers organiza-
tions, the umbrella association representing manufacturers, and
professional organizations (including medical groups, legal groups,
and teachers) were involved in Mapai's political decision-making
during this period; this occurred perhaps because each of these
groups, along with pursuing their own interests, worked towards
the party's main goal of nation-building.30
From 1965 through the 1970's Mapai's ability to set the
political agenda began to change, and this had important effects on
Israeli interest groups. Mapai began to suffer from serious internal
disputes that led to David Ben-Gurion (the party's leader and the
country's prime minister from 1948-1953 and from 1955-1963)
resigning from Mapai and forming a protest party known as Rafi.
Mapai and Rafi eventually reconciled (although without Ben-
Gurion) and together with another party, Ahudut Haavoda, formed
the Labor Party in 1968. 1 But even though Labor remained in
power until 1977, there was not the type of party-dominance over
the state as there had been in years past. Three forces entered the
political arena which reduced Mapai/Labor's power and ultimately
affected the role interest groups were to play in Israeli society.
First, there was the emergence of the opposition Gahal Bloc
that included the more conservative Herut and Liberal Parties.
29 See generally, BENJAMIN AKZIN & YEHEZHEL DROR, ISRAEL: HIGH
PRESSURE PLANNING (1966); PETER Y. MEDDING, MAPAI IN ISRAEL:
POLITICAL ORGANISATION AND GOVERNMENT IN A NEW SOCIETY (1972).
3 Yishai, supra note 26, at 150-51.
31 ARIAN, SECOND REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 113-15.
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Except for a three-year period between 1967 and 1970,32 the Gahal
Bloc served as a new, opposition force at the national level that
emerging interest groups could turn to for support. Throughout the
early 1970's Gahal's popularity steadily increased. Two other
parties, the Free Center Party and La'am, asked to join Gahal, and
by 1973, this enlarged opposition bloc became what is today
known as the Likud party. By 1977 Likud dethroned Labor and
assumed power for the first time in the country's history. During
the election of 1977 (and in every election since), national parties
have practiced "catchall" tactics, whereby there is an appeal to
much of the same constituency for support, including an interest
group constituency that, had been quietly growing within the
country.
34
Second, foreign forces also affected the way Mapai/Labor
controlled the political agenda, and this in turn, affected Israeli
interest groups as well.3 5 The surprise attack by the Arabs in the
1973 Yom Kippur War crippled Labor's leadership legitimacy.
Some groups, such as the Movement for the Greater Israel, the
Progressive Movement, and the Black Panthers36 began to employ
extra-legal tactics in an effort to delegitimize further the Labor
Party government. The traditional idea that interest groups needed
to defer to the ruling party in order to achieve their goals began to
dissipate slowly.
32 Id. at 113. "A coalition was established between Gahal and the ruling
government in light of the Six Day 1967 War. It was a sign of unity that
both political blocs wanted to present to the Arabs."
I' ld. at 96.34 Yishai, supra note 26, at i 52.
35 id.
36 Id. at 152-54. The Movement for the Greater Israel was a group that called
for the expansion of the Israeli state. The Progressive Movement was an
Arab group that demanded an independent Palestinian state. The Black
Panters were a group of Moroccan, Sephardic Jews that called for greater
social welfare services from the government.
2001-2002
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Third, Israel benefited from economic prosperity during the
1970's and early 1980's. 37 Among other things, the standard of
living vastly improved, greater technological advancements were
made, and economic growth increased. During the Israeli
economic "miracle" period attitudes among the Israeli population
towards issues such as the environment, women's rights, and civil
liberties moved in a more progressive direction.38 Of course it is
incorrect to assert that prior to the period of prosperity no Israeli
cared about these types of issues. After all, one of the country's
most well-known environmental groups, the Society for the
Protection of Nature in Israel (SPNI), dates back nearly fifty years.
Yet the goal of groups like SPNI and others, such as the Council
for a Beautiful Israel, was not "to challenge authorities ... but to
foster love of the country." 39 Similarly, women's groups generally
"emphasized the fact that they were pro-Zionist and did not
challenge the foundation of the social order.,
40
But as time passed, many public interest groups started to
pursue an agenda that directly confronted state policies. Women's
groups rejected, what they perceived as, the patriarchal nature of
Jewish culture.4 ' Abortion rights activists, in particular, forcefully'
sought to expand the notion of privacy within Israeli society.
Certain environmental organizations began to employ more
confrontational tactics such as protests, demonstrations, and even
at times, violence.43 In addition, organizations that were unhappy
with the 1948 status quo agreement struck between Ben-Gurion
37 Yael Yishai, "Old" versus "New" Politics in the 1996 Elections, in THE
ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL 1996 140-141 (Asher Arian & Michael Shamir, eds.,
1999); [hereinafter Yishai, Old versus New].
I ld. at 142-44.
39 Yishai, supra note 26at 152.
4' Id. at 154.
41 YAEL YISHAI, BETWEEN THE FLAG AND THE BANNER 65-88 (1997)
[hereinafter YISHAI, BETWEEN THE FLAG].
42 id. at 205-30
43 Interview with Megama Yeruka an environmental activist who is a leader of
one of the most demonstrative organizations in the country, (Sept. 15,
1998).
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and the Orthodox religious community" started actively to voice
their disapproval with the amount of control religious parties
possessed over Israeli society.
45
Between the late 1970's and early 1980's, the state
responded to these agitators by excluding them from participation
within the political process. 46 The party-controlled bureaucracy
refused to address directly the concerns of these groups. Parties in
the Knesset were equally unhelpful. In fact, in 1981 the state
adopted the Law of Associations, which was a statute that required
all interest organizations to be licensed by the Ministry of the
Interior (MOI).47 This law gave the MOI the ability to refuse a
license to an applicant-group, when the agency believed that the
organization threatened the, national security or the public morale
of the country.48 Furthermore, even when the MOI licensed an
organization, the organization had to abide by a number of provi-
sions enumerated in the statute.49
Therefore, the late 1960's, through the 1970's, and into the
early 1980's was a period that transformed Israel's civil society.
The status quo agreement, among other points, stated that the Orthodox
community would control issues of marriage and divorce for all Jews in
Israel. It also stated that the Sabbath would be a government observed
holiday. Furthermore, all state institutions were to observe kashrut, and
members of the Orthodox community were permitted to have a separate
educational system for their children, that was to be funded by the state. For
a further discussion see, MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS, AND
CULTURE IN ISRAEL 48-72 (1994).
45 The types of power wielded by the Orthodox community will be detailed
shortly. For a fuller account see generally, Marc Galanter & Jayanth
Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India and Israel, 34 ISR. L.
R. 101 (2001).
46 Yishai, supra note 26, at 155.
47 See id. at 154-55 (For a discussion of this statute in English).
48 Id. According to the law, the organization may appeal the MOI's refusal to
a district court.
49 For example, an organization must keep records on its finances and
membership; it must hold an annual meeting and elect a central and audit
committee; it must prove that it is not undermining the state. See Yael
Yishai, Regulation of Interest Groups in Israel, 51 PARLIAMENTARY
AFFAIRS 568-78 (1998) [hereinafter Yishai, Regulation of Interest Groups].
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The ability of Mapai/Labor to rule single-handedly and shape the
political agenda ended during this timeframe. Different parties
came into being, economic prosperity grew, and more interest
groups emerged. Furthermore, these groups began to employ
tactics that did not necessarily involve pandering to the ruling party
in power. The state, in turn, responded by excluding these groups
from the political process and by passing a regulatory measure that
limited their autonomy.
From the mid-1980's to the present, Israeli society has seen
further changes. Economically, the country's overall rate of
development has remained high.50 In addition, the state has
gradually reduced its involvement in the economy. Despite the
country's recent financial troubles there is still economic growth.5'
Politically, in response to the repeated pressure applied from
"below," the state has moved towards further including groups in
government policy-making. By encouraging parties to adhere to an
American primary system, and by adopting a direct election system
for the prime minister's seat, the state has sought to satisfy public
calls for making the government more accessible to members of
civil society.52 As the state has become more responsive to these
demands, civil society's importance to the political establishment
has grown. Larger and smaller parties alike are turning to members
of civil society, specifically interest groups, for political support. 53
Yael Yishai notes that paralleling the economic, political,
and legal changes of the 1980's and 1990's has been the trans-
formation of interest group politics in several ways. First, the sheer
numbers of interest groups have multiplied. Today, there are over
30,000 registered interest groups in the country. 54 Second, there is
50 Yishai,, supra note 37, at 140-42.
51 Yishai, supra note 26, at 155.
52 Id. at 156-57.
" Id. at 157.
54 Yishai, Regulation of Interest Groups, supra note 49, at 574-75. Yishai
discusses the fact that the state has not at all enforced the Law of
Associations. Groups are not punished for not submitting "required"
records; no group has ever been disbanded; only two, of the approximately
30,000 that exist, have been denied registration.
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less group-dependence on political parties than ever before. 55
Third, interest groups are more willing to employ legal and extra-
legal tactics to express their points of view.56 Fourth, the
bureaucracy is more open to interest group involvement; there is
greater access to, and influence of, this important nerve-center of
policy formation. 57 Fifth, the state has come to recognize interest
groups--even those that it disdains-as members of the political
and legal process; unlike in the late 1970's and early 1980's it has
not actively excluded adversaries from either the political or legal
arena.
58
Thus, the Israeli interest group arena today is a much
different place than it was in decades past. This discussion has
attempted to provide a brief overview of how interest groups have
evolved in Israel during the past fifty years. In the next section, I
outline my research design" and explain the methodological reasons
for focusing on the litigation strategies of women's groups,
environmental groups, and civil liberties groups. I then provide
information on what role these public interest organizations play
within Israeli society.
II. PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS IN ISRAEL
A. Research Design-Explaining Sources of Data and
Selection of Groups
For this study, I rely on several sources of data. First,
important secondary law and courts studies are referenced. Second,
content analysis is performed on literature produced by Israeli
interest groups. Third, in-depth interview data that I collected from
leaders of thirty-nine groups in Israel during visits in 1998, 1999,
s5 Yishai, supra note 26, at 158-59; n see also, Yael Yishai, Three Faces of
Association Politics: Interest Groups in Israel, 40 POL. STUD.124 (1992).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 160; see also, Yael Yishai, The Guardian State: A Comparative
Analysis of Interest Group Regulation, 11 GOVERNANCE 153, 170-71
(1998).
58 Yishai, supra note 26at 161.
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and 2000 are used as key sources of information. Finally, I rely on
responses to a brief survey I circulated; thirty-six of the thirty-nine
interest groups interviewed also answered this survey.
I specifically focus on three types of Israeli public interest
groups: women's groups focusing on gender equality; environ-
mental groups focusing on pollution-prevention; and civil liberties/
civil rights groups focusing on the issue of separation of religion
and state. For the sake of scope and manageability, the public
interest groups I examine are national (rather than purely local)
organizations; they pursue their respective causes at the national
levels of power. I focus on public interest groups in Israel's two
main political and economic cities, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Unlike
in the United States where groups can be easily identified by
referring to Washington Representatives," a comprehensive
directory that lists interest organizations in the Washington D.C.
area, in Israel no such directory exists. Groups were identified
from a variety of sources, including existing directories,
recommendations from lawyers and social scientists, academic
books and journals, and media accounts. These three sets of groups
are selected for an important methodological purpose. As I shall
show below, they exhibit variation in their use of litigation which
allows for inferential conclusions to be made on my purported
hypotheses. 60 In addition, I examine these three sets of groups
because they are today important political players in Israel.6 1
59 WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVES (2000).
60 For an excellent discussion on selection of cases and the importance of
variation, see GARY KING ET AL., , DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY 129-30,
134, 214-17 (1994).
, Some may contest my characterization of certain Israeli organizations as
"interest groups." To these observers, some groups I focus on may resemble
social movements or more grassroots organizations. Efforts to differentiate
between interest groups and social movements have been made in the past.
See generally, COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING, STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL
FRAMINGS (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996); SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN
MOVEMENT (1994); THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION, SOCIAL CONTROL, AND TACTICS (Mayer Zald & John
McCarthy, eds., 1979). But even with such admirable attempts, the lines
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Unlike in the United States where the explosion in the number of
such groups occurred during the late 1960's and early 1970's,62 in
Israel the population of voluntary organizations within civil society
grew at a noticeable rate only after 1980.63 The technological and
industrial advancements made by Israel during this time frame
modernized the economy and left many Israelis prosperous. As a
result of the country's socio-economic success Israelis could afford
to engage in issues involving gender equality, the environment,
and civil liberties.
64
I should also note that while women's groups, environ-
mental groups, and civil liberties groups typically are viewed as
standard public interest groups, the term "public interest group"
has no one set definition. As Theodore Lowi and Benjamin
Ginsberg note, introductory students of government are often
(incorrectly) taught that as opposed to private groups, the goals of
public interest groups are to promote "the general good rather than
their own selfish interest." 6 p But the fact remains that the lines
between public and private groups are indeed more blurred than
stark. Moreover, conservative or right-leaning groups, which are
not of focus in this study, may qualify as public interest groups as
often are more blurred rather than stark when distinguishing between the
two. This study is not immune from the difficulties in determining whether
or not Israeli groups are actually interest groups or social movements. But
in order provide some definitive boundaries, interest groups for this project
"represent people or, organizations which share one or more common
interests or ideals." GRAHAM WILSON, INTEREST GROUPS IN THE UNITED
STATES 4 (1981). They are formal organizations that have members,
publications, and leaders, and they exist primarily to influence policies and
policy-makers at a given governmental level. Id.
62 See generally, RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1993); THEODORE J. LOwi, THE END OF LIBERALISM
(1979); DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF A POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
(1973).
63 Yael Yishai, The New Politics in Israel, POLITICS AND THE INDIVIDUAL
(2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also, Yishai,
supra note 37 at 141-42.
64 Yishai, supra note 37 at 142-44.
65 THEODORE LOWi & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 502
(2000).
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well. Therefore, whether a group pursues the public interest cer-
tainly depends on who one asks, and any group that "[c]laims to
represent only the public interest should be viewed with
caution.... 66
B. The Groups of Focus for this Study
1. Women's Groups
Having a historical understanding of the women's
movement in Israel is crucial for understanding the behavior and
tactical choices of women's groups today. Thus, before we
specifically address what factors affect whether or not women's
groups in Israel employ litigation, it is necessary to provide a brief
historical overview.
As we have stated, the women's movement in Israel began
gaining momentum in the 1970's. Prior to this time, however, there
were indeed some women's organizations that existed. As early as
1911 women met as an organized group outside of the Yishuv (a
settlement camp in Ottoman-controlled Palestine) to determine
how best they might raise their socio-economic standard of
living.67 In 1921 the Women Workers' Movement (WWM) was
established within the Zionist-based Histradut trade union.61 One
year before the establishment of the WWM another group known
as the Federation of Hebrew Women emerged. (This Federation
66 Id.
67 DEBORAH BERNSTEIN, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY: URBAN WOMEN
WORKERS IN PRE-STATE ISRAELI SOCIETY 20-25 (1987).
68 Because We Care: Movement of Working Women & Volunteers (Brochure
Published by Na'amat). The Women Workers' Movement was the
predecessor to Naamat. The Women Workers' Movement changed its name
to Naamat in 1976; Naamat still exists today as part of the Histradut
(brochures on file with author). See http://www.naamat.org (for more
detailed information).
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was later absorbed by the Women's International Zionist
Organization (WIZO) in 1933).69
Other smaller groups also existed prior to the creation of
the Israeli state.. Groups such as the Women's Society and Union
of Hebrew Women for Equal Rights in Eretz Israel, championed
political equality for women.7 But the overall impact of these
groups on society was limited. Barbara Swirski notes that the
attitudes of the time, coupled with the dominance of patriarchal
interpretations of Judaism prohibited women in pre-state Israel
from being recognized as equal to men.7
1
Following the creation of the Israeli state, women's
organizations were only mildly successful at implementing
changes. The dominant mentality immediately after independence
was to consolidate and strengthen the identity of the nation.7 2
Issues that were not directly related to nurturing this nascent
country (such as gender equality) were placed aside for the time
being. Furthermore, organizations such as the WWM and WIZO
were co-opted by the ruling structure. Both groups-the former
with its affiliation to the dominant political party in power and the
latter with its ties to more conservative, wealthier elements of
Israeli society--did not pursue a direct assault on the governing
system.73 Instead, these and other similarly situated organizations
69 Information from Women's International Zionist Organization's historical
brochures (brochures on file with author). See
http://www.wizo.org/english/index.asp; See The 1998 World WIZO
Plenary, 283' Wizo REV. (1998); Israel's 5 0 'h Anniversary, 284 WiZO REV.
(1998); 1998 WIZOAviv Seminar, 285 Wizo REV. (1998); see also, BRANA
SIMON, WOMEN AND JERUSALEM: 300 YEARS (1995)(Published by
Women's International Zionist Organization); MARK H. GELBER, THE
JEWISH FAMILY (1994)( Published by Women's International Zionist
Organization);. The Voice of Life (Published by Women's International
Zionist Organization).
70 YISHAI,, supra. note 41 at 62.
71 Barbara Swirski, Israeli Feminism New and Old,, in CALLING THE
EQUALITY BLUFF: WOMEN IN ISRAEL 285-94 (Barbara Swirski & Marilyn
Safir eds., 1991).
72 Yishai, supra note 26 at 150-51.
73 YISHAI,, supranote 41 at 63.
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promoted a strong work-ethic, nationalist ideals, and family
values.74 Note, these groups claimed not to have abandoned their
commitment to women's equality; rather they argued that their• • 75
methods were more non-confrontational in nature.
Following the Six Day War in 1967 Israel witnessed a
wave of (primarily American) immigrants making aliyah to the
holy land.'76 Many of these newly arriving individuals were women
who brought with them strong feminist ideological tendencies. The
economy was also progressing steadily, and although post-material
ideals at that time had not penetrated Israeli society as it had in the
West, there was still a sense of revival within civil society.77
During the next two decades more women's groups emerged.
Various women's peace organizations were established; 78 battered
women's shelters and rape crisis centers were set up throughout the
country; and an important grassroots lesbian-rights organization
was founded.79
It is misleading, however, to infer that the increase in
women's groups over the past twenty years has lead to major,
substantive changes for women. In fact, many women in Israel
continue to face discrimination in three specific areas: employ-
ment; abortion; divorce.8° First, in terms of employment oppor-
tunities, while there are a number of statutes that theoretically
protect the rights of women, women nevertheless are unequal
actors in the workforce. There is wage-inequality between the
sexes, and there are de facto ceilings on how high women may
74 id.
75 Yishai, supra note 26 at 153.
76 See generally, KEVIN AVRUCH, AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS TO ISRAEL: SOCIAL
IDENTITIES AND CHANGE (1981).
77 YISHAI, , supra note 41 at 63.
78 Interview with J. Svirski, director of Beit-Shalom (Daughters of Peace),
Jerusalem, Israel (Sept. 27, 1998).
7 YISHAI, , supra note 41 at 83.
so Frances Raday, The Concept of Gender Equality in a Jewish State, in
CALLING THE EQUALITY BLUFF 18-28 (Barbara Swirski & Marilyn Safir,
eds., 1991)
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advance within the workplace.8 1 Furthermore, government agen-
cies are not provided with sufficient authority to deal with such
gender-discrimination claims.82 And there is a cultural and
attitudinal barrier permeating much of Israeli society which refuses
to recognize women as equal citizens capable of performing equal
work.8
3
Second, many women argue that the freedom to control
their own bodies is inhibited by the patriarchal state structure.
Performance of abortion in Israel is a controversial issue. In 1977,
the Knesset (Israel's parliament) passed a restrictive law regarding
abortion, although within this particular law certain exceptions
were provided.84 Abortions could be performed if approved by a
state oversight committee. The oversight committee, according to
the law, was to take into consideration: "the age of the woman, her
health, marital status, and illegal circumstances surrounding the
pregnancy (i.e. rape, incest)! An additional provision, known as the
Social Clause, authorized committees to approve abortions on the
basis of difficult socio-economic conditions surrounding the
woman or her family."85
S Dafna Izraeli, Women and Work: From Collective to Career, in CALLING
THE EQUALITY BLUFF 165-77 (Barbara Swirski & Marilyn Safir eds., 1991).
82 Frances Raday, Women, Work and the Law, in CALLING THE EQUALITY
BLUFF 178-86 (Barbara Swirski & Marilyn Safir eds., 1991)
83 See generally Frances Raday, Equality of Women Under Israeli Law, 27
JERUSALEM Q. 81 (1983); VICKY RANDALL, WOMEN AND POLITICS: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1987); Uri Ram, Emerging Modalities of
Feminist Sociology in Israel, 8 ISRAEL SOC. SC!. RES. 51 (1993); YISHAI,,
supra note 41 at 161-74; Dafna Lzraeli and Ephraim Tabory, The Political
Context of Feminist Attitudes in Israel, 2 GENDER & SoC'Y 463 (1988).
84 Noga Morag-Levine, Imported Problem Definitions, Legal Culture, and the
Local Dynamics of Israeli Abortion Politics, in ISRAEL: THE DYNAMICS OF
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 229-30 (eds., David Levi-Faur, Gabriel Sheffer,
and David Vogel, 1999) [hereinafter Morag-Levine, Imported Problems];
Noga Morag-Levine, Abortion in Israel: Community, Rights, and the
Context of Compromise, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY313 (1994); see also,
YISHAI, , supra note 41 at 205-22.
85 Morag-Levine Imported Problems at 230.
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Under pressure from the Orthodox Jewish community, the
Knesset in 1980 removed this Social Clause from the statute.
86
Since 1980, the abortion law has been a point of conflict between
feminists who seek fewer restrictions on a woman's right to
choose, and religious activists who wish to limit further the ability
of women to have an abortion.
87
Third, Israel's "personal law" structure, or millet system, is
seen as severely limiting the rights of women. 88 In Israel, personal
law today encompasses two areas of family law: marriage and
divorce. Civil law states that matters of marriage and divorce are
to be held within the jurisdiction of each recognized religious
community in the country. Hence, Jews are governed by rabbinical
courts; Muslims are governed by Islamic, Shari 'a courts; Druze are
governed by Druze courts, and so on.
90
For Jews, in particular, the rabbinical courts are
administered by Orthodox Jewish rabbis who apply Jewish
religious law, or Halachah.91 The inequality Jewish women face is
most explicitly seen in terms of divorce proceedings. It is true that
divorces are permitted by Jewish law, but rabbinical courts
86 Id.
87 Although interestingly, there were some leaders of certain women's groups
who told me that obtaining an abortion in Israel, even with these
restrictions, is not difficult.
88 The term millet comes from the Ottoman Empire and it refers to a system
whereby the Turks allowed the various religious communities within their
empire to govern matters relating to family law. See, Galanter & Krishnan,
supra note 45; also see EDELMAN, supra note 44 at 52.
The definition of personal law has undergone changes over the years.
During the time of the Ottoman Empire, personal law included marriage
and divorce, as well as maintenance, inheritance, guardianship, legitimation,
incompetency, adoption and burial. During the British Mandate, personal
law was narrowed to -include only marriage divorce, alimony, and
succession. In 1953 the Israeli Knesset further narrowed personal law to
include only marriage and divorce. See EDELMAN, supra note 44 at 51-54.90 See, Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 45.
91 Id. In a deal known as the "status quo" agreement struck between the
secular Zionist government of Ben-Gurion and the religious parties of the
time, it was decided that the Orthodoxy would be the governing authorities
in matters relating to marriage and divorce. See also infra note 114.
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strongly favor preserving marriages. Rabbinical courts continue to
insist that the husband actually deliver a formal divorce decree,
known as a get, to his wife in order to finalize the divorce." Even
where a wife receives approval from the rabbinical court to divorce
her husband, if the husband does not deliver the get, there is no
divorce. Under Israeli state law, the wife may ask the Attorney
General to demand that the husband appear in front of a (state)
district court to justify why he refuses to provide a get.93 A
husband may even be jailed by the district court in order to coerce
the delivery of the get if the court is dissatisfied with the husband's
explanation. But there are known situations when, even after being
jailed, the husband refuses to issue a get to his wife. 94 In these
cases, the wife is left to live her life as an agunah (a "tied"
woman95), and the repercussions on women are severe.. Rabbinical
courts prohibit an agunah from re-marrying. If the agunah has
children as a result of a new relationship, her children. are labeled
as mamzerim (bastards) by the rabbinical courts. According to the
rabbinical courts, manizerim in Israel are only permitted to marry
other manizerim. 96 Not surprisingly, many Jewish women in Israel
see the millet system as highly restrictive on their civil rights.
Israeli Arab women who are Muslim also face forms of
inequality with respect to divorce proceedings. Although evidence
exists that Muslim women typically receive alimony payments
upon a divorce,97 the circumstances under which Israeli Muslim
women may petition for a divorce are restrictive.9" Furthermore,
92 Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 45 (I have been told by Rabbincol scholars
that Jewish law states that the wife must also agree to a get. Thus, the wife
can refuse as well, however problems arise because the implications when
the husband refuses are worse due to religious law restrictions).
93 Id. See generally, D. SHARFMAN, LIVING WITHOUT A CONSTITUTION 79
(1993).
94 SHARFMAN, supra note 93, at 79.
95 Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 45.
96 SHARFMAN, supra note 93 at 79.
97 EDELMAN, supra note 44 at 80-82.
9' Id. at 82-84.
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there is a social stigma many divorced Muslim women face within
their communities which can be highly traumatic. 99
The above overview places into context how the women's
movement in Israel has evolved over the years. This discussion has
also focused on the main impediments that continue to contribute
to the inequality women face. We next turn to examining the
second set of our public interest groups, environmental
organizations.
2. Environmental Groups
Whereas environmental groups in the United States
prominently emerged in the late 1960's and throughout much of
the 1970's, environmental activism really took shape in Israel
during the 1980's.1°° Up until 1980, only four nationally active
environmental organizations existed in Israel; all were govern-
ment-funded and considered "partners" with the state.' 0' The
oldest environmental group, the Society for the Protection of
Nature in Israel, rarely (if ever) challenged state-authorities.
Similarly, the country's most well-known anti-pollution organiza-
tion, Malraz, was hardly belligerent in its tactics. 02 Environmental
groups before 1980 urged Israelis to love, nurture, and work with
the state in preserving the beauty of the country's landscape. 0 3 As
99 In Israel women of other religious minority communities, such as those who
follow the Druze religion, also face gender discrimination in divorce
proceedings. For a further discussion see id. at 89-99.
10o Noga Morag-Levine, Insiders, Outsiders, and Legal Convergence:
Consensus and Disputes in Israeli Environmentalism, 8 (1998) (unpublished
paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Morag-Levine, Insiders, Outsiders). For a
comparative study on the range of environmental enforcement mechanisms,
see generally, Marcia Gelpe, The Goals of Environmental Enforcement and
the Range of Enforcement Methods in the United States and Israel, 14 TEL
Aviv STUD. IN LAW 135 (1998).
ol Yishai, supra note 26 at 150.
102 Malraz no longer exists today. It disbanded a few years back and many of
its members joined other environmental groups.
103 Yishai, supra note 26 at 150.
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Noga Morag-Levine notes, with such a non-political aura
pervading Israeli society, it is not surprising that hardly any
environmental' litigation was present at this time.1
0 4
There. are several reasons why Israel experienced such little
environmental activism between 1950 and 1980. First, government
policies during this time were focused on industrializing the Israeli
economy. The various governments in power believed that the
Israeli state needed to modernize quickly and stay technologically
ahead of its. neighbors in order to survive. 10 5 Prioritizing
industrialization, however, came at the expense of the environ-
ment. Several, environmental activists argue that this high-paced
development.of the country's infrastructure contributed to massive
soil erosion and air and water pollution. Government officials
though believed that such environmental concerns were secondary;
once the Israeli state achieved industrialized status it then could
turn its attention to other issues.'
0 6
Second, prior to the 1980's funding for environmental
causes, from both the government and outside sources, was
minimal. Only- after 1980 did the New Israel Fund (NIF), one of
the country's. most prominent funding agencies, begin to direct
money specifically towards the environmental movement.'
0 7
Indeed, the environmental sector by the 1990's saw an important
increase in the. number of environmental organizations. By 1996,
there were twenty-one nationally based environmental groups and
twenty-three locally based environmental groups. 1
08
Third,, beginning in the 1980's the environmental move-
ment received. a surge of support from westerners migrating to
Israel. These! American and European environmental 6migr~s
0"4 Morag-Levine, Insiders, Outsiders, supra note 100 at 8.
05 See generally Yishai, supra note 26; also, see generally, David Vogel,
Israeli Environmental Policy in Comparative Perspective, 5 ISRAEL AFF.
(1999).
106 Id.
107 See, supra note 16.
l0B SHIRLI BAR DAVID & ALON TAL, HARNESSING ACTIVISM TO PROTECT
ISRAEL'S ENVIRONMENT: A SURVEY OF INTEREST ACTIVITY AND
POTENTIAL 31 (1996).
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brought with them ideas, initiatives, and proposals to improve the
Israeli ecosystem. In addition, Israelis interested in environmental
issues began traveling back and forth between Israel and the West.
This free flowing exchange of ideas and information eventually
helped strengthen Israeli environmentalism.'
0 9
Scholars who study Israeli environmental groups contend
that in recent years environmental legal and administrative action
is on the rise." In a survey of national and local environmental
groups, Shirli Bar-David and Alon Tal report that "[flormal
appeals to administrative or legal forums have at some point been
attempted by 60% of the organizations."' In the part III of this
article, I examine the tactics of environmental groups and then
delve into their specific use of litigation. As I shall show, my data
is more conservative in estimating how many environmental
groups engage in the legal process. However, before I address this
topic, I offer a brief historical background of the civil liberties and
civil rights movement in Israel.
3. Civil Liberties and Civil Rights Groups
Recall that the research design for this study includes those
civil liberties and civil rights groups that espouse the separation
between religion and state. Indeed while the question over what
role religion should play in politics currently is extremely intense,
this debate dates back to the founding of the modem Israeli state.
When Israel achieved its independence in 1948 a deal, referred to
as the "status quo" agreement, was struck between the secular,
Zionist government of David Ben Gurion and the Orthodox
religious parties of the time. 1 2 This agreement provided that the
state would recognize: the Sabbath as the official holiday for the
state; kashrut (kosher food) as the only meals permitted to be
109 Morag-Levine, Insiders, Outsiders, supra note 100 at 11.
110 BAR-DAVID& TAL, supra note 108 at 16.
"' Id.
112 See EDELMAN, supra note 44 at 51; see also, Galanter & Krishnan, supra
note 45.
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served in state institutions; rabbinical control over family law; and
a two-track educational system where Jews could send their
children either to secular state schools or to state-funded Orthodox
religious schools." 3 In return, the religious parties were to pledge
that they would not impede the development of the Israeli state.
Since 1948, there has been an on-going struggle over the
status quo agreement. On the one hand, there are those who
contend that the state's above-mentioned concessions have
undermined Israel's democracy. The argument is that the Ortho-
doxy wields a disproportionate amount of influence over important
issues that include: "who is a Jew" for purposes of marriage and
divorce; the allocation of government funding; and Arab-Israeli
security negotiations.115
On the, other hand, there are those within the various
Orthodox religious communities that believe the state has reneged
on many of the provisions of the status quo agreement. These
religious advocates argue that the state, particularly the courts,
have repeatedly-moved the country in a pointedly secular direction.
Since as early as 1962, when the Israeli Supreme Court decided in
13 Id.; see generally, MARTIN GILBERT, ISRAEL (1998).
114 EDELMAN, supra note 44 at 51-52. It is important to keep in mind that the
term "Orthodox" in Israel really does not include members of the
Conservative- or Reform Movements, both of which are a very small
minority in Israel. In fact, rather than using the term "Orthodox", Israelis
frequently use the term "religious" in describing this community. While the
divisions among Jews are quite subtle and complex, there is a noteworthy,
recognized, two-fold divide within the Israeli Jewish community. First,
there is a chasm between those who consider themselves secular and those
who see themselves as religious. Second, there is a division within the
religious Jewish community-between the Orthodox/religious and the
"Ultra-Orthodox"/ultra-religious. For a detailed discussion of the nuances
within the Israeli Jewish community, see generally, IAN S. LUSTICK, FOR
THE LAND AND THE LORD: JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL (1988);
Menachem Friedman, Jewish Zealots: Conservative versus Innovative, in
JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: RELIGION,
IDEOLOGY, AND THE CRISES OF MODERNITY 159-75 (Laurence J. Silberstein
ed.,. 1993).
115 Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 45.
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the famous Brother Daniel case"16 that it, not the Orthodoxy,
would determine who could qualify as a Jew for purposes of
applying for citizenship, many in the religious community have
charged that the Jewish identity of the state is being slowly
secularized.11 7 In fact, just as recently as 1999, the Supreme Court
came under attack by ultra-Orthodox Jews who held demonstra-
tions protesting a wave of decisions, that in their view, undermined
Judaism. "1
8
It is true that the debate over religion is as old as the state
of Israel. But what is relatively new is that the forces currently
advocating a secular state are of a different form than they were in
the past. Today, we see in Israel better-organized groups within
civil society calling for a reduction in the Orthodoxy's role in state
politics. Secular-based groups, human rights groups, and even
116 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior (Brother Daniel Case) (1962)16 P.D.
2428.
I,7 See Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 45.
11 These cases have not yet been translated into English. See, Haim Shapiro,
A List of Haredi Grievances, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 12, 1999, at
www.jpost.com. This article summarizes the Court decisions that the Haredi
are against. The decisions include: Two Court rulings that disallowed the
withdrawal of a kashrut certificate in a public hall that displayed a
Christmas tree as well as in another facility that held a New Year's Eve
party; a Court ruling that prohibited military deferrals or exemptions for
yeshiva students; a Court ruling that prohibited the Jerusalem Religious
Council from setting the budget of a political party; a Court ruling that
allowed for secular burial; a Court ruling that mandated that women be
accepted in a course run by the Employment Service Board; two Court
rulings stating that Reform and Conservative members be allowed to sit on
religious councils; a Court ruling that allowed a girl to return to a secular
school after her father withdrew her; a Court ruling that prohibited moshav
rabbis from engaging in certain political tactics; a Court ruling refusing to
enforce the wearing of a kippa in a rabbinical court; a Court ruling allowing
the registration of Reform conversions; a Court ruling prohibiting rabbis of
one sect to distribute holy oil to voters; a Court ruling in favor of holding
exams for women pleaders in rabbinical courts; and a Court ruling against
giving double subsidies to Bnei Akiva, a religious youth movement. See
also, Haim Shapiro, Women of the Wall Win High Court Hearing,
JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 18, 1999, at www.jpost.com (Court allowing women
to hold the Torah and wear shawls as they pray at the Western Wall).
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some religious groups are strongly unified in their demand that the
state be free, from the influence of the Orthodox Jewish com-
munity. For these reasons, civil liberties and civil rights organiza-
tions are important members within the public interest population
in Israel.
III. SURVEYING THE TACTICS OF ISRAELI PUBLIC
INTEREST GROUPS
Observers in the United States frequently mention that the
tactics of interest groups are many and diverse.' 9 Is the same true
for Israeli organizations? Leaders from thirty-nine groups des-
cribed to me the types of tactics they employ. Table 1 displays the
results.
Table 1. Reported Tactical Use by Public Interest Groups
Public awareness activities, including publishing materials and/or 100%
holding educational seminars
Use of the media 67%
Participate in demonstrations or protests 62%
Informal contacts with legislators or bureaucrats 54%
Monitoring of government activity 51%
Involved in policy formation; served as members of government 46%
committee
Formal Contactiwith bureaucrats or legislators (includes direct 46%
lobbying)
Litigation 33%
Work in conjunction with parties 26%
N 39
119 See, e.g., SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 9 at 150; JEFFERY M. BERRY,
LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE 212-252 (1977). For other studies on this
subject, see JOHN HEINZ ET AL.,, THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS
IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 63-69 (1993); Anthony Nownes & Patricia
Freeman, Interest Group Activity in the States, 60 JOURNAL OF POLITICS
88, 92 (1998); Thomas L. Gais & Jack L. Walker Jr., Pathways to Influence
in American Politics, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA 104-11
(Jack L. Walker Jr. ed., 1991).
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The table highlights a number of different points. First,
every group publishes materials and/or holds seminars for the
purposes of making the public aware of the organization's
activities. About two-thirds of the groups use the media as a
technique, and sixty-two percent participate in demonstrations or
protests. The data from my research indicate that there are two
types of activities that involve slightly over half the groups. Fifty-
four percent of the groups have informal contacts with legislators
and bureaucrats, and fifty-one percent regularly monitors govern-
ment proceedings. In addition, forty-six percent of groups are
involved in policy formation, and this same percentage is engaged
in formal contacts with policy-makers. Twenty six percent interact
with political parties, and finally, with respect to litigation, a third
of all groups use this strategy.
Tables 1 only displays the aggregate figures of interest
group tactics. Table 2, however, provides disaggregated data for
my findings.
120 Yael Yishai in 1989-1990 conducted the first large scale survey of Israeli
interest group tactics. In this study Yishai examined a variety of groups,
including business groups, labor unions, agricultural groups, and public
interest organizations. I do not compare her data on public interest groups
with mine because in her study she places public interest groups under the
category of "promotional organizations." Not only are women's groups,
environmental groups, and civil liberties groups included in this category
but so too are sports and leisure groups, foreign policy groups, cultural
groups, and charity groups. When reporting her data on the tactics of these
promotional organizations, Yishai does not disaggregate the results by
group type. The data for this table has been updated and recomputed from
Jayanth K. Krishnan, New Politics, Public Interest Groups, and Legal
Strategies in the United States and Beyond (2001) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison). See YISHAI, , supra note 20
at 248-75.
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Table 2. Reported Tactical Use by Individual Sets of Groups' 21
Women Envir. Civ.Lib/Rts Chi Square
Public awareness 100% 100% 100%
activities, including
publishing materials
and/or holding
educational seminars
Use of the media 63% 53% 100% 6.29**
Participate in 56% 47% 100% 6.18**
demonstrations or
protests
Informal contacts 50% 40% 88% 5.92*
with legislators or
bureaucrats
Monitoring of 31% 53% 88% 6.8**
government activity
Involved in policy 50% 33% 63% 1.82
formation; served as
members of govern-
ment committee
Formal contacts with 38% 40% 75% 2.52
legislators or bureau-
crats (includes
lobbying)
Litigation 44% 13% 50% 4.39
Work in conjunction 31% 13% 38% 2.36
with parties
N 16 15 8 39
*p<.10
** p <. 0 5
121 The data for this table represent the tactics the groups used at the time the
interviews were conducted (1998-2000). For a review of how the groups
were selected; see earlier discussion under part II. Also, in this discussion, I
refer to civil liberties/civil rights groups simply as civil liberties groups.
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Notwithstanding public awareness activities, in each row
we see numeric variation for the different sets of groups, but do
these variations reflect statistically significant differences? I
answered the question of statistical significance as a two step
process. First, I computed a chi square test for statistical
significance across the three groups. The chi-square is shown in
the last column of table 2. If the test did not indicate significance at
least at the .10 level, I concluded that there were no statistical
differences among the three groups in their use of the particular
tactic. If the initial test did indicate statistically significant
differences among the groups, I proceeded to conduct a series of
difference of proportions tests to determine what differences were
statistically significant.122 (For the difference of proportions tests, I
use p < .05). We see from the last column in table 2 that the chi-
squares for four of the tactics are statistically significant at a .05
level. These tactics include media-usage, demonstrations and
protests, informal contacts with policy-makers, and monitoring
government officials' activities. First, in terms of media use, we
see that sixty-three percent of women's groups, fifty-three percent
of environmental groups, and every civil liberties group
participates in this tactic. Among the paired comparisons for this
tactic, only the variation between women's groups and
environmental groups is not statistically significant.' 2 In terms of
the difference between women's groups and civil liberties groups
and between environmental groups and civil liberties groups the
differences are statistically significant.' 
24
122 The difference of proportion tests constitutes a set of post hoc comparisons.
Ideally, one would perform these comparisons using a statistical procedure
intended for such a comparison (e.g. Scheffee' or Bonferonni procedures
used in analysis of variance). Unfortunately, there is no such procedure, but
this small number of comparisons is such that the dangers of paired
comparisons are minor. See DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE,
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 604-06, 770 (1999).
123 Z = .57; P .569.
324 For the former, the Z score is 3.06 and the P value is .002. For the latter the
Z score is 3.6 and the P < .001.
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For the next tactic, demonstrations and protests, 57% of
women's groups, 47% of environmental groups, and every civil
liberties group engage in this tactic. The results from the difference
of proportions tests show that there are no statistically significant
differences between women's groups and environmental groups in
the use of this, strategy.125 But the difference between women's
groups and civil liberties groups is statistically significant, as is the
difference between environmental groups and civil liberties
groups. 126 For the tactic that involves informal contacts with
policy-makers, once again, the difference of proportions results
indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between
women's groups and environmental groups in the use of this
tactic.127 However, statistically significant differences do exist
between women's groups and civil liberties groups and between
environmental groups and civil liberties groups."' Finally, with
respect to monitoring the activities of government officials, the
difference in the use of this strategy is not statisticall' significant
between women's groups and environmental groups.. But there is
statistical significance in the difference of usage between women's
groups and civil liberties groups and between environmental
groups and civil liberties groups. As for litigation, this tactic is
used by forty-four percent of women's groups, thirteen percent of
environmental, groups, and fifty percent of civil liberties groups.
For litigation the chi-square is below the critical values; this
125 Z = .56; P .575.
126 In the comparison between women's groups and civil liberties groups the Z
score is 3.5 and the P value < .001. In the comparison between
environmental, groups and civil liberties groups the Z score is 4.1 and the P
value < .001..
127 Z = .50; P .617.
121 In the comparison between women's groups and civil liberties groups the Z
score is 2.24' and the P value is .025. In the comparison between
environmentaligroups and civil liberties groups the Z score is 2.81 and the P
value .005.
129 In the comparison between women's groups and civil liberties groups the Z
score is 3.5 and the P value is .001. In the comparison between
environmental groups and civil liberties groups the Z score is 2.03 and the P
value is .042.
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suggests that there are no statistical differences among the three
sets of groups in the use of this policy technique.
The above discussion provides a detailed examination of
the tactics used by public interest groups in Israel. In the next
section, I focus specifically on the last strategy discussed, that of
litigation. I first examine whether or not the standard explanations
fully answer the question of when groups will and will not select
litigation as a policy tactic. I show how in fact neither theory
applies fully to the case of Israel. Following this discussion, I offer
a set of hypotheses which argue that the ideas, ambitions, and
goals of organizational leaders also must be considered when
seeking to understand the litigation decisions of public interest
groups. I then provide in-depth qualitative and quantitative evi-
dence that supports several of these hypotheses. The data are
important and particularly relevant to observers of American
interest group litigation. The findings suggest that the traditional
theories on why groups use courts in the United States need
reconsideration. Let us begin by turning to the first of our standard
theories, the institutional accessibility perspective.
IV. THEORIES OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION
A. Institutional Accessibility Theory
One explanation that is thought to affect when groups will
and will not employ litigation is what we might call the institu-
tional accessibility theory. This particular argument states that the
degree of institutional accessibility to courts is directly related to
how frequently groups participate in lawsuits. 130 So, for example,
given a system where the courts are legitimately viewed, respected
institutions, where the threshold for engaging in litigation is low,
we might expect interest groups regularly to participate in lawsuits
as a means to satisfy their policy objectives. Conversely, where the
130 See Scheppele & Walker, supra note 3 at 165; DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 9-12 (1977); POSNER, supra note 9 at 64;
SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 9 at 373-76.
VOL. XX
Public Interest Litigation
threshold for participating in lawsuits is high, interest groups are
thought not to, employ this tactic on a regular basis. One common
indicator of whether or not courts are accessible involves
examining what the existing rules of standing are.131 In comparison
to systems where there are few standing requirements, the
expectation is, that interest group litigation rates will be low in
systems where' several standing requirements must be met before a
group is allowed to participate in the legal process.'
32
B. Resource-Based Theory
Another commonexplanation that is often cited for whether
or not interest groups use litigation is the resource-based theory.
The standard resource-based argument states that groups with more
resources will be more likely to use litigation than groups with
fewer resources. A corollary to the resource-based argument is that
groups that have resources but are unsuccessful in affecting
policies at the legislative and/or the executive levels of govern-
ment, will be more likely to turn to the courts as a means to further
their policy objectives.133
Resources have many different dimensions. Money is a one
type of resource, but so too is legal expertise. Michael McCann
notes that legal; expertise can be extensively developed over years
131 See LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS 102-03 (1992).
132 See Lowi & GINSBERG, supra note 65 at 343 (for a basic, although
informaionarldiscussion of this point).
133 Some have referred to this idea also as the political disadvantage thesis. For
a series of works that have discussed the importance of resources, see
Scheppele & Walker, supra note 3 at 181; KAREN O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S
ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF COURTS 23 (1980); BAUMGARTNER & LEECH,
supra note 12 at 143; JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 25-35 (1978); FRANK J. SORAUF, THE WALL OF
SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE 42
(1976). For the classic work on the importance of resources, see generally,
Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 96 (1974).
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of group involvement in litigation. 134 Resources also can take on
different forms including assistance from like-minded groups
and/or aid or counsel from government agencies or legal staff.135
Groups possessing these types of resources then might be expected
to opt for litigation as a strategy to satisfy policy objectives.
C. The Puzzle
1. Testing Applicability of Standard Theories
In the United States these two standard explanations appear
to account .for whether or not groups use litigation as a public
policy tactic. Although American courts today have the potential
for being strong policy-making institutions, some studies suggest
that "litigation is a relatively uncommon technique when compared
to other group activities."' 36 Why? For one thing, there are a
number of institutional hurdles to gaining standing in the United
States. In general prima facia proof is required that a defendant
actually injured the plaintiff. A plaintiff needs to demonstrate that
the injury suffered is traceable to the defendant. The plaintiff must
also show that the courtroom is the proper arena to redress this
grievance.' 37 Furthermore, since the Supreme Court's decision in
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission,138 a group
may acquire standing in a lawsuit only after showing that each of
its members, individually, suffered an injury. The Court also stated
that an organization gains standing only if the lawsuit is related to
134 MICHAEL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 108-11 (1994).
135 See Jayanth K. Krishnan & Kevin den Dulk, So Help Me God, 30 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. LAW 233 (2002).
136 BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra notel2 at 143; see also, DAVID KNOKE,
ORGANIZING FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 207-08 (1990); Nownes & Freeman,
supra note 119 at 92.
For a work that discusses these points, see SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra
note 9 at 373; BAUM, supra note 131 at 102-03.
138 James B. Hunt, Jr., Governor of the State of North Carolina, et al., v.
Washongton State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
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the organization's purpose of existence. 39 Therefore, the bar is
quite high for American public interest groups that wish to bring
lawsuits to achieve certain policy outcomes.
Limited resources also appear to account for why lawsuit
participation by American public interest groups is not a
commonly used tactic. Studies note that participating in lawsuits
on a regular basis is an expensive endeavor for these organiza-
tions. 14 1 Whether it is due to a lack of money, too few attorneys on
staff, or insufficient legal assistance few public interest groups in
the United States are capable of frequently participating in the
prolonged tactic of litigation. The availability of resources, then, is
seen as a main factor in determining whether or not these types of
American groups use litigation as a public policy tactic.
But in other countries, are the institutional and resource
theories necessary and sufficient for understanding when groups
will and will not turn to the courts? Consider the case of Israel.
Israel serves as an optimal country to test the alternative
explanations. The conditions in Israel appear ripe for many groups
to use litigation as a policy tactic. Yoav Dotan notes that the costs
for participating in litigation in Israel are low. Particularly when
the Supreme Court sits as the High Court of Justice (HCJ):
139 Id. at 343. Note, a group serving as legal counsel to a client is not required
to meet the Hunt criteria.
140 Rules of standing are not the only hurdles that plaintiffs must cross in order
to participatein lawsuits in the United States. Article II of the Constitution
limits the exercise of judicial power to cases and controversies. See, U.S.
CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 1. This phrase has been interpreted to mean that an
interest group's lawsuit will not be sustained unless there is an actual,
defined conflict between adversarial parties. A group that brings a lawsuit
also must show that the issue it wishes to litigate is not moot. The group
must demonstrate that its claim is timely, factually still relevant, and has not
been resolved: by some means. See ROBERT A. CARP AND RONALD
STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 133-34 (2nd ed., 1993).
141 See, e.g., EPP, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 4 at 58-61, 69-70;
SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra note 9 at 376-78; Scheppele & Walker,
supra note 3 at 181-83.
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[A]ccess to the Court is assured by minimal court
fees and by the lack of cumbersome formal require-
ments. A petition to the HCJ can be written by a
layman, and at no stage of the proceedings is
representation by a lawyer required. 142
Furthermore, beginning in the 1980's the country's
Supreme Court broadened the legal definition of standing.143 In the
most significant of these cases, Ressler v. Minster of Defense,144
the Court decided that so long as an individual or group has a
claim relating to government misconduct, that person or organiza-
tion could file a constitutional claim directly in the Supreme
Court.145 Yet despite such favorable institutional conditions, if we
refer back to table 1, we see that based on my interview and survey
data litigation is one of the least used tactics by Israeli public
interest groups. As table 1 notes, only a third of Israeli groups I
examined pursue their policy objectives through the legal process.
In addition to lenient institutional requirements for entering
into court, several Israeli interest groups also have seen a growth in
142 Dotan, supra note 7 at 323. The Supreme Court of Israel has multiple
functions. It serves as the court of last resort (having discretionaryjurisdiction) in everyday civil and/or criminal cases. It serves as a court of
appeals for serious cases involving civil or criminal offenses. And it serves
as a court of first and last resort when it sits as the High Court of Justice
(HCJ). The HCJ hears cases that directly challenge the legality of a public
body. Public bodies may include public agencies, local authorities, public
companies in some cases, private bodies acting in a public capacity, the
legislature, and the President. (It is uncertain if the HCJ will hear a case
directly against the Prime Minister). See id. at 322-24; see also, Marcia
Gelpe, Constraints on Supreme Court Authority in Israel and the United
States: Phenomenal Cosmic Power; Itty Bitty Living Space 13 EMoRY INT'L
L. REV.493 (1999).
'4' See, H.C. 217/80, Segal v. Minister of Interior, 34 (4) P.D. 441; H.C.
1/81Shiran v. Israeli Broadcasting Authority,, 35 (3) P.D. 365.
'4 H.C. 910/86, 42 (2) P.D. 441.
145 See, supra note 142. It is important to note that Israel has no formal
constitution but instead has a series of Basic Laws that serve as the
foundation for Israeli constitutional jurisprudence. See Gelpe, supra note
142.
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resources during the past two decades. Below table 3 provides
information on whether or not Israeli groups with more resources
are more likely to use litigation than groups with fewer resources.
Table 3. Ranking Israeli Interest Groups on Basis of Resource-
Possession
High Medium Low Bottom
(Top /) (Second /4) (Third /4) (Last )
% using 50% 40% 30% 11%
litigation
% not using 50% 60% 70% 89%
litigation I I I I _I
N 10 10 10 9
Chi Square - 4.37, df = 3, p = .193
As we have stated, resources of course have a variety of
definitions. This table provides a blunt measure of group-resources
by focusing on the financial budget of interest organizations.
Resources appear important for whether or not Israeli groups
participate in lawsuits. The table shows that of the groups that are
in the top quartile (with respect to resources) 50% engage in
litigation; of those in the bottom quartile, only 11% litigate. But of
the groups that fall into the "medium resource" category forty
percent litigate, and of the groups that fall in the "low resource"
category nearly a third litigate. The fact that there is a relatively
even distribution among the top three categories intimates that
other factors. must also affect the decision-calculus of
organizational policy makers.'
46
146 Data on financial resources were provided during the interviews. In some
cases, groups even allowed me to review annual financial reports
(anonymity requested).
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D. Importance of Interest Group Leadership Goals
Aside from institutional and resource factors, I argue that a
set or taxonomy of interest leadership goals also affects whether or
not public interest organizations opt for litigation as a policy tactic.
The literature is replete with both classic and more recent studies
that suggest goals can and do affect behavior. Many years back
Abraham Maslow postulated his famous humanistic theory of
motivation that said the study of goals and motivations is key to
fully understanding why people act the way they do.1
47
Maslow suggested that individuals have a hierarchy of
goals, needs, and motivations that drive human behavior. Others,
such as J. Stacy Adams, have observed that people's everyday
behavior is often driven by the goal of erasing the financial, social,
and political inequities they encounter on a regular basis.
48
Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross have elaborated on this idea by
proposing that goals are important in affecting the decision-making
calculations of individuals. 149 David McClelland has argued that a
person's goals can shape expectations, thoughts, and even achieve-
ment levels. 150 More recently, Edward Deci and Richard Flaste
have suggested that an individual's specific set of goals affects the
strength in which that person works towards a particular
objective.151 In addition, for years interest group scholars who
focus on organizational maintenance have noted that the priorities
and agendas of leaders, in particular, determine the tactics
undertaken by groups.'52
147 See generally, ABRAHAM MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY
(published by Harper & Row)(1954).
248 See generally, J. STACY ADAMS, EQUITY THEORY: TOWARDS A GENERAL
THEORY OF SOCIAL INTERACTION (1976).
149 See generally, RICHARD NISBETT AND LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
Iso See generally, DAVID MCCLELLAND, HUMAN MOTIVATION (1985).
151 See generally, EDWARD L. DECI AND RICHARD FLASTE, WHY WE DO WHAT
WE Do (1995).
152 See e.g., Jack L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups,
77 AM. POL. SCI.. REV. 390 (1983); Lawrence Rothenberg, Organizational
Maintenance and the Retention Decision in Groups, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
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Drawing on this rich literature, I hypothesize that the goals
of interest group leaders affect not only if, but how frequently,
organizations litigate. On the basis of how many lawsuits they
participated in per year, groups were ranked and then placed into
one of four categories: "regular," "moderate," "infrequent," or
"non-users" of litigation. (Note I place groups into these categories
on the basis of natural breaks in the statistical distribution).'53
I specifically identify and examine five goals:
1. A Utilitarian Goal
2. A Reputation Goal
3. A Role Fulfillment Goal
4. A Donor-Satisfaction Goal
5. A Publicity Goal
Below I present a set of hypotheses regarding these goals. First, I
make hypotheses on the nature of the relationship that I expect to
exist between each goal and how frequently a group uses litigation.
Second, I hypothesize about what goal will be most important for
regular users, moderate users, and infrequent users in their decision
on whether or not to litigate.
The first goal in my taxonomy is the utilitarian goal. This
goal relates to the amount of desire group leaders have towards
winning at litigation. The expectation is that the more a group
desires to achieve policy objectives through litigation, the more
frequently that group will litigate. Conversely the less a group
1129 (1988); Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,
13 MIDWEST J OF POL. SCI. 1 (1969); see generally TERRY M. MOE, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INTESTESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE INTEGRAL DYNAMICS
OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS (1980); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
153 In addition, each group interviewed was asked to self-describe themselves
as a "regular," "moderate," "infrequent," or "non-user" of litigation. Only in
a handful of instances did the self-description provided by the group not
match up with my primary method. (In these cases I labeled the group on
the basis of the actual number of cases in which they participated, rather
than relying on their self-description).
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seeks to achieve policy objectives through litigation, the less
frequently that group will litigate. The hypothesis then is that a
positive relationship exists between the utilitarian goal and the
frequency of litigation. I further hypothesize that this desire to
achieve policy results through litigation is the most important goal
for why regular users employ this tactic. To some these hypotheses
perhaps seem obvious. But the tactical decision-making process is
complex. Group leaders may choose to litigate for several reasons,
including satisfying internal membership demands or highlighting
an issue in a legitimate public forum. 154 For this reason it is
important to test these particular hypotheses. 155
Second, there is a reputation goal. The more that leaders of
a group seek to maintain, preserve, or establish a reputation for
being a litigating organization, the more frequently that group will
litigate. 156 Conversely, a group whose goal it is to avoid being
labeled as a "litigator" is expected to use litigation only on rare
occasions or not at all. The hypothesis then is that there is a
positive relationship between the reputation goal and the frequency
of litigation.
Third, there is a rolefulfillment goal; how much pressure or
obligation a group feels from partners within the same policy
network to litigate will affect whether or not the group participates
154 See e.g, MCCANN, supra note 134 at 61-64; Ronen Shamir, Litigation as a
Consummatory Action: The Instrumental Paradigm Reconsidered, 11 STUD.
IN LAW, POL., & SOC'Y 41 (1991); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS
OF RIGHTS 139 (1974).
It is important to note that the idea of winning at litigation can take many
forms, from winning a judgment or verdict to gaining an injunction order to
receiving a settlement. This desire to achieve policy results through
litigation may be caused by several factors, including the fact that the group
has previously won using this tactic or that a group is not successful using
other tactics of influence. Regardless, the idea that group leaders are
affected by the utilitarian goal certainly plays a role in whether or not this
tactic is selected.
156 For a related discussion on reputation, see, HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE
JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 165-76 (1991);
Herbert M. Kritzer and Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyers Seeking Clients:
Clients Seeking Lawyers, 21 LAW& POL'Y 347 (1999).
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in the legal process. The hypothesis is that the more pressure a
group feels to, fulfill the role as a litigating organization, the more
likely the group will litigate. (Group leaders may feel such
obligation or pressure for several reasons, including the fact that
their organization is specialized or possesses certain skills). In
contrast the less pressure a group feels to fulfill the role as a
litigating organization, the less likely a group will litigate. The
hypothesis then is that a positive relationship exists between the
role fulfillment goal and the frequency of litigation.
The fourth goal is the donor-satisfaction goal. The
hypothesis is that a positive relationship exists between the
importance that a group places on satisfying donor-demands and
how frequently that group uses litigation. In other words groups
that place more importance on currying favor with donors will use
litigation more frequently. Groups placing less importance on
satisfying the wishes of donors will use litigation less frequently.
Based on empirical work performed on over 1,300 interest groups
in the United States, Scheppele and Walker show that most
financial patrons disdain' and refrain from supporting the tactic of
litigation because of the time involved in the judicial process, the
uncertainty of results, and the high costs. 57 Organizations using
litigation on a more frequent basis recognize that their supporters
are atypical and uncommon in the world of interest group
contributors. After all, these contributors know the downsides of
litigation but are still willing to support groups that use the courts,
perhaps because of a belief that the legal system is the best arena
for achieving important policy objectives. With such contributors
being few and far between, I argue that groups using litigation
more frequently do so because they are quite beholden to their
donors' wishes. Conversely, groups using litigation less frequently,
or not at all, are less dependent upon the wishes of these types of
donors. Because such groups can and do draw on a wider array of
support they are not as tied to, influenced by, or concerned with the
wishes' of individual patrons when devising strategy.
1'7 Scheppele & Walker, supra note 3 at 162-64.
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In addition, I hypothesize that "moderate users," in
particular, will view donor-satisfaction as the most important goal
for whether or not they employ litigation. The donors for moderate
users especially fall into the above-mentioned category of being
atypical or uncommon. Patrons who specifically donate to
moderate users like this idea that the groups they support are active
in a variety of strategies, including litigation.' 58 These donors
appreciate contributing to "jacks of all trades" because of the belief
that the more pathways that are pursued, the more likely it is for
policy objectives to be achieved. 59 Because such types of donors
are far from common, moderate users are highly sensitive to this
donor preference. Group leaders know they must remain active in
several types of tactics, including litigation, if they want to receive
continued financial support.
Finally, there is a publicity goal. This goal of publicity is
distinct from reputation in that it relates to how much a group
seeks to highlight a cause-rather than its own name-to the
public. I hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between
the publicity goal and the frequency of litigation. Otherwise put,
the less importance placed on publicity, the more likely a group
will use litigation on a regular basis. Conversely, the more
importance a group places on gaining publicity through the legal
process, the less likely it will use litigation.
Litigation is a very public tactic; going to court draws the
attention of many observers within society. As I shall show
because regular users of litigation typically are more established
and better-known, they do not view generating publicity for a
cause as importantly as other goals when making tactical decisions.
In contrast I suggest that groups using litigation less frequently
believe that in most situations the best way to advocate a cause is
by engaging in more non-confrontational, non-public types of
strategies. Such users simply prefer other approaches to dealing
158 For data showing that groups using litigation in moderate amounts use a
variety of strategies, see, supra note 119.
159 This idea of multiple pathways of influencing officials comes from, Gais &
Walker, supra note 119.
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with issues. However, there are those situations when *these types
of groups indeed opt for litigation, and I argue the reason they do
so is mainly because of the intense desire to highlight the cause to
an otherwise uninformed or politically unaware public. There is a
real sense among these groups that going to court raises public
awareness as well as publicly legitimizes an issue in a way that no
other tactic can. 160 Perhaps not surprisingly, then, I also suggest
that the publicity goal is the most important goal in whether or not
"infrequent users" employ litigation.
This section thus makes a number of hypotheses regarding
interest group leadership goals. To summarize, the utilitarian goal
is hypothesized to be the most important goal affecting whether or
not regular users litigate. The donor-satisfaction goal is hypo-
thesized to be the most important goal affecting whether or not
moderate users litigate. The publicity goal is believed to be the
most important goal affecting whether or not infrequent users
litigate. And, a positive relationship is hypothesized to exist
between:
" the utilitarian goal and how frequently a group uses litigation;
• the reputation goal and how frequently a group uses litigation;
• the role fulfillment goal and how frequently a group uses
litigation; and
• the donor satisfaction goal and how frequently a group uses
litigation.
While a negative relationship is hypothesized to exist between:
* the publicity goal and how frequently a group uses litigation.
In the next section, I first test the accuracy of the most
important goal hypotheses. I separately evaluate regular users,
moderate users,, and infrequent users of litigation. Following this
discussion I then focus on the set of hypotheses involving whether
the relationship between the goals and the frequency of litigation is
positive or negative. I end the article with a detailed conclusion of
how the findings from this study are important and applicable to
160 For support of this hypothesis, see MCCANN, supra note 134 at 61-64;
SCHEINGOLD, supra note 154 at 139; HANDLER, supra note 133 at 214-22.
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furthering our understanding of group litigation not only in Israel
but in the United States as well.
E. Applying Theory to Data-Assessing the Most Important
Goal Hypotheses
1. Regular Users
For those groups I categorize as regular users approximately
40% are women's groups, 20% are environmental groups, and 40 %
are civil liberties groups.' 61 Table 4 lists each of the groups.
Table 4. Regular Users of Litigation in Israel
Group Type
New Family Women's Group
Shedula * Women's Group
Adam Teva V'Din Environmental Group
Association for Civil Rights Civil Liberties Group
In Israel (ACRI)
Israel Religious Action Civil Liberties Group
Council (IRAC)
*The Shedula today is a much different organization than when I first
collected this data in 1998-1999. However, the lessons learned from
this group are valuable, and for this reason I include it in the study.
Is the utilitarian goal the most important factor affecting
whether or not regular users employ litigation? To ascertain the
answer I asked the leaders from each of the regular users to rank
the goals in order of importance from one to five. (Five was
labeled as most important while one was labeled least important).
For example, below Israeli regular users "I" and "J" might have the
respective rankings:
161 Recall that I place each group into the category of regular, moderate, or
infrequent user of litigation on the basis of the number of lawsuits it
participates in per year.
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Goals Group "I" Group "J"
Utilitarian Goal 5 1
Reputation, Goal 4 2
Role Fulfillment Goal 3 3
Donor Satisfaction Goal 2 4
Publicity Goal 1 5
After receiving every regular user's ranking, I added up the total
score for each goal. (For instance, in the above hypothetical the
total score for the utilitarian goal would be six). I then computed
the mean score for each goal. Figure 1 provides a bar chart graph-
ing the mean score of each goal for regular users. The figure
unexpectedly shows that the desire to achieve policy results
through litigation, or the utilitarian goal, is not the most important
goal for regular: users. Instead, the reputation goal has the highest
mean score for Iraeli regular users of litigation.
Figure 1
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Below figure 2 disaggregates the results by showing the mean
scores for women's groups, environmental groups, and civil
liberties groups.
Figure 2
Regular Users by Group Type
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The second figure displays how there are differences among the
groups in terms of four of the five goals. But again the key finding
is that the reputation goal, rather than the utilitarian goal, is cited as
the most important factor affecting whether or not Israeli regular
users employ litigation as a policy tactic.162 A common theme
162 To show variation on the independent variable of reputation, I report that
3/5 regular users stated it was most important, while 2/5 stated it was
second most important. No moderate user or no infrequent user stated that
reputation was most important. I also report that for the environmental
group in this part of the study, I received two sets of responses to the
survey. One response came from an official affiliated and working with the
group while I was conducting my research. The other response came from
an official who had left the organization before I started doing my field-
work. I rely on the former for this study.
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found throughout the interviews was that maintaining a reputation
for being a litigating organization was a crucial factor that drove
regular users to use the legal process. Conversely, regular users
repeatedly stated that if a case might hurt the group's overall
reputation, then it would be less likely to litigate the case.
For example, Irit Rosenblum, a one-time lead attorney and
a board member of Women's International Zionist Organization,
and currently the head of the New Family Organization, noted the
complexity involved in the decision-making process. 163 "It's not
just about money," this official repeatedly commented. For one
thing, the salience of the particular issue certainly matters.
Rosenblum is likely to turn to the courts over an issue that is
highly salient and impacts a large segment of society. But she
considers a number of other factors as well. Of these Rosenblum
noted that the most important is that she seeks to maintain a reputa-
tion for not being afraid to use litigation as a policy tactic. Accord-
ing to Rosenblum, many would-be or potential violators of
women's rights refrain from behaving illegally because they are
aware that they may incur a legal challenge from her organization.
For the sake of women throughout Israel, then, it is key that she
and the groupiretain the reputation for being a staunch defender of
legal rights.
There are other secondary and tertiary considerations for
Rosenblum as well. For example, she sees legal victories as an
overall legitimization of the goals that she pursues. The strides
women, sucki as she, have made within the legal arena are
respected within the eyes of the general public and other state
institutions. Furthermore, Rosenblum currently engages in litiga-
tion because most of the group's members support fighting for
women's rights through the courts. Rosenblum takes her cues from
supporters and, thus does not shy away from using litigation as a
common policy tactic. And Rosenblum noted that because there is
so little cohesion between the various women's groups in the
163 Interview with attorney Irit Rosenblum, Director of New Family Organiza-
tion,, Tel Aviv; Israel (Sept. 24, 1998); second interview, Oct. 7, 1998.
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country, she feels a need to litigate on her own. 164 This statement
supports other previous research that contends that although the
differences that once existed among Israeli women's organization
no longer are as deep-seated, "women's associations in Israel
hardly ever act as 'sisters."
' 165
The factors that affect when elites like Rosenblum will and
will not employ litigation support my broader contention that the
ideas, interests, and goals of the group's leaders are extremely
important. Clearly a combination of factors affect the decision-
calculations on whether or not to litigate. But ultimately, as this
official noted, reputation-concerns do remain the most important
factor that affects if this particular tactic is selected.
The empirical data gathered on those other regular users of
litigation yield similar results. For example, the environmental
organization, Adam Teva V'Din, is another regular user of
litigation. Adam Teva V'Din (literally translated as Man, Nature,
and Law, but more commonly known as the Israel Union for
Environmental Defense) was founded in 1991 by Dr. Alon Tal.
Tal, an Israeli-born attorney and Harvard-educated environmental
scientist, formed Adam Teva V'Din in the hopes of bringing
environmental awareness to Israel.' 66 Adam Teva V'Din today has
close to 1,700 fee-paying members and receives its other funding
through private foundations from within Israel as well as abroad. 167
In 1996 Tal stepped down as director of the organization,
and Dan Fisch took over as the new leader. Fisch, an American-
born Jew who practiced law in California and then made aliyah in
the 1970's, also has a license to practice law in Israel. In his
interview with me, Fisch provided a complete picture of what
factors affect whether or not Adam Teva V'Din opts for litigation
as a policy tactic. Resources, according to Fisch, are a definite
consideration. An environmental "problem" will come to Adam
64 Id. (Sept. 24, 1998).
165 YISHAI,, supra note 41 at 81.
16" Amber Landau, The Greening of Israel, JERUSALEM POST Sept. 12, 1997.
167 Id. Interview with Fran Goldman, official working at Adam Teva V'Din,
Tel Aviv, Israel (Sept. 28, 1998).
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Teva V'Din, and it will be discussed by the different leaders of the
organization in a conference meeting. The group will try to see if
there are ways to resolve the problem without having to employ
litigation. Alternative means to "fixing the problem are often
cheaper than going to court."'
168
However, being the only true public environmental
litigation firm in Israel, Fisch indicated that Adam Teva V'Din
considers other factors before deciding whether or not to employ
litigation. Specifically, Fisch stated that Adam Teva V'Din has a
reputation to maintain among the Israeli public. A case may enter
the firm, and even though the matter may not be one that leads to a
precedent-setting judgment, Fisch may nevertheless decide to liti-
gate. Why? Fisch indicated that Adam Teva V'Din cannot solely
be interested in "big-name" cases. Adam Teva V'Din is a public
interest group that is known for serving the needs of the entire
public, not just, the wealthier, or better-known segments of it.169
Furthermore, as a result of its reputation, other non-litigious
environmental groups depend upon Adam Teva V'Din's legal
expertise to handle the bulk of environmental legal matters. The
organization has on staff a number of attorneys and scientists, as
well as close to two dozen environmental analysts who are all
specialists in environmental law. Even the country's oldest
environmental group, the Society for the Protection of Nature in
Israel (founded, in 1953), has almost moved completely away from
litigating environmental cases, because of Adam Teva V'Din's
reputation for being the main litigating organization in Israel.170 As
Fisch remarked;. "our name is who we are; people rely on us
because of our reputation and we can't let them down.''
168 Interview witliDan Fisch, Director of Adam Teva V'Din, Tel Aviv, Israel
(Sept. 28, 1998). Note, at the time of the interview Fisch was the leader of
the organization. Currently, the leader is Phil Warburg, an American from
the Environmental Law Institute who also made aliyah.
169 Id.
170 Interview with aileader of Society for the Protection of Nature who asked to
be referred to just as "Abe," Jerusalem, Israel (Oct. 13, 1998).
171 See, supra note:168.
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Fisch discussed two cases in particular to highlight the
importance of the reputation goal. In Adam Teva V'Din v. The
National Planning and Building Council,17 2 Fisch's group sought
to block the construction of a trans-national highway that it
believed would cause irreparable environmental harm. The group
made a procedural argument to the Supreme Court contending that
because certain requirements listed in two Israeli statutes were not
followed by those authorized to build the highway, the construc-
tion should not go forward. Adam Teva V'Din lost, but as Fisch
indicated, the group litigated this case, not only just to win, but for
other reasons as well. By bringing such a case to court, the group
was able to draw the public's attention to an issue which, up to that
point, had received little press coverage. More importantly though,
had the group not litigated this case its reputation for being the
country's environmental champion most certainly would have
come into question. 
73
The importance of the group's reputation came up in a
second case that Fisch described to me. In this case, Adam Teva
V'Din sued Haifa Chemicals Incorporated for their production of
hazardous chemicals.' 74 From the start Haifa Chemicals was very
reluctant to go to court, especially knowing they would face the top
environmental lawyers in the country. To avoid litigation, the
company agreed to a landmark settlement with Adam Teva V'Din
in 1996.175 Fisch noted that because private industries know that he
is willing to go to court opponents take his group's demands very
.72 95 (2) 147 (1995).
173 See, Morag-Levine, Insiders, Outsiders, supra note 100, at 14. Note, Noga
Morag-Levine argues that Adam Teva V'Din suffered its "most
disappointing litigation venture," with the loss of this case. During my
interview with Fisch, however, the director staunchly rejected Morag-
Levine's interpretation, citing instead the benefits the group (and the
environmental movement) received from the publicity and awareness this
case generated.
'74 For a discussion of this case, see, ADAM TEVA V'DIN 5 (1995).
175 See, Morag-Levine, Insiders, Outsiders, supra note 100, at 14-15. The
settlement included Haifa Chemicals contributing a large amount of money
to an environmental trust fund as well as attorneys' fees to Adam Teva
V'Din.
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seriously. 176 Clearly from this latter example, the reputation of
Adam Teva V'Din helped the group "win" without even having to
set foot in court.
177
Thus, the information gathered from the interview with
Dan Fisch indicates that reputation is extremely important in
whether or not this organization selects litigation as a policy
option. The fact that reputation matters does not imply that neither
resources nor institutional factors are irrelevant. As Fisch indica-
ted, resources are an important consideration. He also stated that
having the institutional flexibility ability to petition the Supreme
Court directly on matters involving the state is quite beneficial for
his group. But- this interview reveals one very important fact: the
decision-calculus of a group contemplating litigation is complex,
subtle, and multi-dimensional.
One of the major and most senior "regular users" is the
Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI). Established in 1972,
ACRI has served as the country's leading organization that
promotes civil' liberties and civil rights. As its charter states,
"ACRI is a strictly nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that
protects the rights of all individuals in Israel and in the occupied
territories, regardless of religion, nationality or political beliefs."',
78
As Benjamin, Beit-Hallahmi, a former board member stated,
176 See, supra note 168.
177 Pressure from members and donors is also another important factor that
affects the decision-calculus of leaders within Adam Teva V'Din. Along
with the paid. staff, there are hundreds of volunteers that work for the group.
The expectation from the vast majority of these people, according to the
head of the employees staff, Fran Goldman, is that Adam Teva V'Din will
use the law to improve the pollution-problems that affect Israeli society.
Furthermore, donors such as the Ford Foundation, the Nathan Cummings
Institute, the Bronfman Organization, and the New Israel Fund, also
contribute money to Adam Teva V'Din on the assumption that the group
will employ litigation as a tactic to further the environmental movement
within the country. (Budgetary reports provided to the author by the staff of
Adam Teva V'Din).
178 Association for Civil Rights in Israel mission statement and charter,
available at http://www.nif.org/acri/acintro.html.
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"ACRI just wants all people to have equal access to the
government."1
79
ACRI's charter lists a variety of activities in which it
participates, including education, public outreach and awareness
programs, informal and formal lobbying tactics, counseling, and
legislative consultation.' 80 Among the most used tactic by the
group, however, is litigation. In my interview with an attorney
from ACRI, I was told that the decision to use litigation is based on
a number of important factors. But reputation concerns, in
particular, play a pivotal role in whether or not ACRI takes a case.
For example, in a move that surprised many observers,
ACRI a few years back initially did not petition the Supreme Court
to strike down a law that prohibited motorized vehicles during the
Sabbath from operating on a particular street inhabited by ultra-
Orthodox Jews. According to the attorney I interviewed, ACRI
studied this issue and decided that those who were interested in
challenging this law were not truly in favor of fostering tolerance
or religious pluralism within the Israel. Instead, many of the
opponents to this law had ulterior motives that included seeing the
Orthodoxy completely marginalized from politics. In the eyes of
ACRI, ties to such uncompromising individuals risked placing
ACRI's reputation as an inclusive, equal opportunity organization
in serious jeopardy. Clearly the group believes that without a good
name it is really not in a position to fulfill its mission which is to
help the helpless and defend the defenseless.' 8'
Preserving a strong reputation is also important for another
reason. ACRI's high-powered name often "forces" the state to
address certain concerns of the group. A not-so-infrequent occur-
rence is that ACRI will file suit against a state ministry that has
initiated a policy that ACRI opposes. Before the case is heard in
court, a government official will typically contact an ACRI
179 Interview with Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, former board member of ACRI,
Haifa, Israel (Sept. 11, 1998).
Is0 Association for Civil Rights in Israel, supra note 178.
IS8 Interview with attorney from ACRI who requested protection of identity,
Jerusalem, Israel (Aug. 15, 1998).
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attorney to discuss what changes might be made in the implemen-
tation of the policy. If no agreement can be reached, then ACRI
proceeds with the suit. However, the next time the government
considers policies relating to this type of issue, a member of ACRI
usually will be consulted on how the regulation or law should be
drafted. ACRI's reputation as a group that will not hesitate to
litigate as well as its reputation for being an expert in various
policy matters allows the group to be involved in the development
of many important issues. 82
It is crucial to note that while the reputation goal is
extremely valued by ACRI, other considerations enter into the
decision-calculus as well. For example, favorable institutional
factors (the ability to petition directly the Supreme Court) and
sufficient resources enable the group to use litigation on a regular
basis.18 3 ACRI members and constituents are also very supportive
of the group's litigation efforts. Furthermore, when it is likely that
litigating a case may lead to landmark changes in the law, then this
factor becomes another consideration ACRI takes into account.
And, where ACRI believes there is a need to make the public
aware of an important issue, then this too plays a role in the
decision-making process. 184
The above evidence indicates that a variety of factors
matter greatly for the regular users of this study. However, on
average, reputation concerns were cited as indeed crucial.
Statistically, then, is the score given for the reputation goal by
these regular users significantly different from the rest of the goals
cited? In order to determine whether or not the difference between
the most important goal (reputation) and the rest of the goals cited
was statistically significant, I conducted a series of what is known
as paired samples tests. (These statistical tests are explained and
illustrated in Appendix A). The results indicate that there is indeed
statistical significance in the difference between the reputation goal
and the rest of the goals cited. The fact that the reputation goal is
1&2 Id.
183 id.
184 id.
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distinctively important demonstrates that not only resources and
institutional accessibility determine whether or not Israeli regular
users decide to litigate.
2. Moderate I IS
Of the Israeli moderate users I examined, 25% are civil
liberties groups and 75% are women's groups. No environmental
group qualified as a moderate user. Table 5 lists the Israeli
moderate users.
Table 5. Moderate Users of Litigation in Israel
Group Type
Emunah Women's Group
Naamat Women's Group
Women's International Zionist Women's Group
Organization (WIZO)
Masorti Civil Liberties Group
For these groups, figure 3 shows the hypothesis is
confirmed; satisfying the perceived needs of donors is the most
important goal that affects whether or not Israeli moderate users
select litigation. (As I did with regular users I asked moderate users
also to rank the goals against one another on a 1-5 scale. (Here too
I calculated the total score for each goal and computed the mean).
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FIGURE 3
Goals That Affect Moderate Users
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Interviews with moderate users provide useful information
on why they are so interested in satisfying their donors.' 85 For
example, Naamat, the organization known as the Women Workers'
Network until 1976, is a moderate user of litigation. A lead
attorney for Naamat, whom I shall refer to as Natalie, noted that
her organization uses litigation as a tactic to advance the rights of
women both in the workforce and at home. Naamat is active in
185 Interviews with several sources, the names and locations are confidential.
(75% of moderate users said that donor satisfaction is most important.
Contrast this finding with the fact that no regular user or no infrequent user
cited donor satisfaction as most important. Also, I recognize that for Israeli
moderate users, I do not break down the means for women's groups and the
civil liberties group. The reason is because several moderate users asked
that I not disclose their responses; publishing such disaggregated data I
ultimately decided would have jeopardized the confidentiality of those
groups seeking to have their identities protected).
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fighting wage inequality, promotion barriers, and sexual harass-
ment in the work environment. In family matters, the organization
counsels and educates women who are victims of domestic
violence or who live in an abusive family situation. On occasion
the group submits petitions to the rabbinical courts on behalf of
women seeking divorce. The group also takes special interest in
legally assisting women in civil court when property is being
divided between a divorcing couple.'
86
As in the case with the other organizations, a variety of
factors affect when Naamat will and will not employ litigation as
policy tactic. However, the donor-satisfaction goal is particularly
crucial for this group when deciding whether or not to litigate.
Natalie noted that she and the other Naamat leaders do not ever
seriously consider stopping the use of litigation. Donors and mem-
bers of Naamat expect the leaders to use litigation as a policy
tactic. According to several officials with whom I spoke, including
Natalie, contributors who support Naamat like the fact that the
group engages in a variety of tactics. Furthermore, if these donors
sensed that Naamat was not employing every possible technique to
further the group's cause-including using the legal channels on
an occasional basis-then there was a perceived fear among the
group's leaders that donors would cease their financial support.
I wondered why Naamat, a group with such a long history,
worries so much about pleasing donors. Does not the group enjoy a
strong financial base of support? After all, the group is one of the
oldest in Israel. But as I was told, Naamat today is an organization
very different than even ten years ago. In the past Naamat was not
seen as an adversarial organization that forcefully promoted
women's rights. Only recently has this transformation occurred.
Naamat, in a sense, is a very new group with a newer agenda and
newer financial supporters. For this reason the group is highly
sensitive about its donors' wishes. An example provided by Natalie
186 Interview with Natalie, Tel Aviv, Israel (Sept. 28, 1998)(It is important to
clarify that while rabbinical courts determine who may marry and who may
divorce, other issues, such as the division of property in a divorce, are
handled by civil courts).
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highlights this point. In the early 1990's some of Naamat's more
important financial supporters began to scale back their
contributions.
As a result Naamat actively searched for other donors to
make-up for this lost funding. Eventually newer contributors
decided to support the group, but these funders informed Naamat's
leaders that they were interested in raising public awareness about
sexual harassment in the workplace. The donors expressed a desire
to use a range of tactics (including litigation) to accomplish this
objective. As it happened, later that year the group launched a
comprehensive tactical campaign against sexual harassment. As
part of this effort it brought suits against private employers and
state agencies thought to be guilty of sexual harassment. As the
Naamat official remarked, "we followed the lead of our donors
both because we had to and because we wanted to; many people
did learn about this issue, and many women benefited in the
process."18
7
The other moderate users also noted that they pay
significant heed to donors' wishes. Because these groups tend to
rely on the financial support of only a few donors, leaders
acknowledged that they do not have as much autonomy as they
would like in devising tactical strategies. According to other
moderate users I interviewed, litigation is viewed by many in
Israeli society as a conflict-oriented, divisive tactic; as such the
financial donors of moderate users have stated they do not wish
litigation to be used as a regular tactic. However, at the same time
several of these same donors have also told the group leaders that
they are interested in seeing litigation used on some occasions.
Specifically in those cases when no other group will litigate on
behalf of these particular moderate users, donors have told group
elites not to fear defending themselves in court. As the attorney for
187 Id.
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one group mentioned to me, "it is a real balancing act that we have
to follow."'
88
Again, like I did for Israeli regular users, I conducted a test
on Israeli moderate users to determine whether or not the dif-
ference between the most important goal cited (donor satisfaction)
and the rest of the goals was statistically significant. The results,
which are presented in the Appendix B, confirm that in almost
every comparison there are statistically significant differences
between the donor satisfaction variable and each of the other goals.
In other words, the qualitative and quantitative data indicate that
the wishes and concerns of financial donors are indeed important
for these groups that engage in litigation on a moderate basis.
3. Infrequent Users
For those groups that I qualify as infrequent users, 50% are
women's groups, 25% are environmental groups, and 25% are civil
liberties groups. Table 6 lists the infrequent users in Israel.
Table 6. Infrequent Users of Litigation in Israel
Group Type
Woman to Woman Women's Group
Women of the Wall Women's Group
Society for the Protection of Environmental Group
Nature in Israel (SPNI) I
Menuha Nakohna Civil Liberties Group
Below figure 4 shows that the hypothesis is confirmed; the
publicity goal is most important for whether or not infrequent users
litigate. (As I did with regular users and moderate users I had
'88 Interview with anonymous source, attorney from organization that
moderately uses litigation, in Tel Aviv, Israel (Oct. 14, 1998). Identity of
group and individual protected upon request.
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infrequent users rank the goals against each other on a 1-5 scale. I
then calculated the total score for each goal and computed the
mean).
Figure 4
Goals That Affect Infrequent Users
Mean
Scores
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Goals
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This finding als6 confirms past research that suggests certain
groups will use the legal process as a means of generating attention
for a particular cause or issue.'8 9 Clearly the high priority placed
on the publicity goal by infrequent users is a finding that cannot be
ignored.
1s9 See, MCCANN, supra note 134, at 61-64; EPSTEIN, supra note I at 154-55
(1985). Note, 75% of infrequent users stated that the donor satisfaction goal
was the most important; no regular or moderate user ranked this goal as
most important. Also, for the same reason as stated in supra note 185, 1 do
not list the individual scores for each set of groups.
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Consider, for example, the Society for the Protection of
Nature in Israel (SPNI). SPNI is the only other environmental
group in this study to use litigation. In its nearly fifty-year history,
SPNI has used litigation as a policy tactic less than twenty times.'
90
The lack of turning to litigation seems surprising, especially given
the fact that SPNI won one of the most famous environmental
litigation cases against the government in the country's history.' 9'
SPNI, however, began as an organization that was very much in
sync with the government's Zionist Land Ethos policy. This policy
essentially called on Israelis to protect the environment, so long as
their actions did not conflict with the nationalist goals of the state
(which included industrializing the society, securing the country's
borders, and keeping the country open to all Jews who sought
refuge). For many years, SPNI simply preached a harmonious
message of cherishing the land and purposely did not interfere with
state ambitions. 
92
SPNI experienced a change in direction during the late
1980's and early 1990's. The growth in post-material values'
93
along with imported American ideas towards the environment are
thought to have impacted the behavior of SPNI. 194 Since then the
group has moved in a more aggressive direction to challenge
specific government actions. However, because of its history and
the fact that it derives a percentage of its budget from the state,
190 Morag-Levine, Insiders, Outsiders, supra note 100, at 19. Interview with a
prominent leader in group who wished to be referred to as Hanna,
Jerusalem, Israel (Oct. 13, 1998).
191 Id. In this particular case, the group received a court order blocking the
construction of a potentially environmentally hazardous radio transmission
station that was to broadcast to southern republics of the former Soviet
Union. The court refused to allow the project to continue until the environ-
mental impact analysis was revised along the lines set out by the court.
During the period of delay caused by the case, the U.S. decided to cancel
the project, noting that the reasons were unrelated to the environment or to
the litigation.
192 Interview with SPNI leader named "Hanna," supra note 190.
'9 Yishai, supra note 26, at 156-57.
194 Morag-Levine, Insiders, Outsiders, supra note 100, at 11.
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many other environmental activists are suspicious about whether or
not SPNI is really independent.
Grassroots activities, public awareness campaigns, and
informal political lobbying are the most common tactics used by
SPNI. Litigation, however, remains a tactic that the group is
hesitant to deploy. A leader interviewed for this project stated that
SPNI does not have an in-house staff of attorneys who can
represent the group in court on a regular basis. Thus, it must hire
outside counsel which results in an expense that the group is not in
a position to afford.1
95
Furthermore, according to this official, while SPNI has
moved away from being "in bed with the government, 196 the
organization does not necessarily wish to have a hostile relation-
ship with those in power. SPNI has historically been a group that
works towards reconciliation and compromise. There is a sense
among the SPNI leadership that if litigation were employed too
often, the group may then develop a negative image or reputation;
something it seeks to avoid. 197 SPNI has spent decades fostering a
relationship with the state. Although there has been some
disagreement with the state over the years, the belief among many
leaders is that employing litigation more regularly would
jeopardize, if not sever, the ties the organization has with important
government contacts.
In addition, many in SPNI's leadership recognize that Dan
Fisch's organization, Adam Teva V'Din, is the most effective
environmental litigation group in the country. SPNI is aware that if
a contentious environmental law matter arises, Adam Teva V'Din
is more than likely to become involved in the case. For this reason,
SPNI oftentimes will refrain from participating as a litigator,
simply because there is someone else already doing the job.' 98
195 Interview with "Abe," leader within SPNI organization, supra note 170.
1% Id.
197 Id.
198 Note, Dan Fisch expressed annoyance at SPNI's constant lack of interest in
participating with his organization to fight the state on particular legal
cases. He cited the important highway transportation case mentioned above,
that his group lost, as one instance where an alliance between the two
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Also, there is pressure from a number of influential
members within SPNI not to use litigation as a policy tactic.'
99
Noga Morag-Levine discovered this in her work on SPNI. As she
notes, there is a "Iingering ambivalence on the part of some
[members] within SPNI' '200 towards this specific strategy. For
example, there are a number of lay constituents that join SPNI for
the purpose of working on grassroots activities. While these
constituents know that the group is engaged in some institutional
tactics (such as lobbying) they are not interested in seeing SPNI
devote substantial amounts of time and effort towards litigation.
20 1
Even with all of these reasons, the publicity goal in my
taxonomy was still cited as the most important reason why SPNI
does not use litigation on either a regular or moderate basis. Group
leaders, very simply, do not see this tactic as effectively promoting
the group's message to the public. The other, above-mentioned
tactics are thought best to convey SPNI's mission and purpose.
Furthermore, because SPNI is the most well-known and oldest
environmental organization in Israel, there is not a feeling among
the leaders that the group needs to litigate for the purposes of
gaining publicity.
Interestingly, for the same reason that SPNI mainly does
not engage in litigation, there are times when the group believes
for certain issues going to court is the best way to educate and
arouse public awareness. Understandably some may be baffled by
this seeming paradox. But upon further explanation, the rationale
seems quite logical. According to the high-ranking SPNI official
groups may have affected the outcome. According to Fisch, had SPNI
signed on as a co-petitioner with Adam Teva V'Din in this case, the
government, because of it past relationship with SPNI, might have
considered scaling back its environmentally damaging highway project.
Interview with Dan Fisch of Adam Teva V'Din, supra note 168.
199 Interview with Abe, leader within SPNI organization, supra note 170.
200 Morag-Levine, Insiders,Outsiders, supra note 100 at 19.
201 Interview with Abe, leader within SPNI organization, supra note 170. In
fact, SPNI may be characterized as more of a conservation organization,
with its biggest emphasis being on preserving nature trails and promoting
guided hikes.
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whom I interviewed, while the organization is the country's oldest
and best-known (and therefore not thought of as needing
publicity), some of the group's more recent environmental causes
are quite new and unfamiliar to much of the public. And while
SPNI prefers to organize and coordinate public awareness cam-
paigns to educate citizens on such new and often complicated
issues, these efforts take vast amounts of time, energy, and
planning. Hence, when. the group believes an issue needs to be
immediately brought to the public forefront, it will seriously
consider litigation as an option. As the official stated, "litigation
can be a quick, easy way of bringing attention to a [newer and less
familiar] cause that needs to be addressed. 20 2
The discussion to this point has focused on what goals are
most important for the three different types of users. The
particularly surprising finding is that the reputation goal, rather
than the hypothesized utilitarian goal, is most important for regular
users. In the next section we turn our attention to examining
whether the relationship between each of the goals and the
frequency of litigation is positive or negative. Otherwise put, the
next section will test the following (above-mentioned) hypotheses:
" Whether a group that places more importance on the
utilitarian goal will be likely to litigate more frequently
(testing for a positive relationship);
* Whether a group that places more importance on the
reputation goal will be likely to litigate more frequently
(testing for a positive relationship);
" Whether a group that places more importance on the role
fulfillment goal will be likely to litigate more frequently;
(testing for a positive relationship);
202 Id. Please see Appendix C for the results of the paired samples test on
infrequent users. Unlike the results for regular and moderate users, the
paired samples results for infrequent users need more interpretation as two
of the comparisons are statistically significant.
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" Whether a group that places more importance on the donor
satisfaction goal will be likely to litigate more frequently
(testing for a positive relationship); and
• Whether a group that places more importance on the
publicity goal will be likely to litigate less frequently
(testing for a negative relationship).
F. Applying Theory to Relationship Data-Employing a
Poisson Regression Analysis
As we know from our earlier discussion, I determine the
frequency of litigation for each group on the basis of how many
cases the group litigates per year. In order to test whether the
relationship between each goal and the frequency of litigation is
positive or negative, I use a statistical model known as a poisson
regression analysis.20 3 During the interviews, I had each of the
interest group policy makers place a level of importance on each
goal independently of one another. Each respondent was able to
select from the following choices: very important; important;
slightly important; not important. I also test for whether resources
203 I use a poisson regression analysis because of the fact that the frequency of
litigation (my dependent variable) is based on a raw count of the cases each
group litigates per year. In statistical terms this raw count is known as a
"count variable." (A count variable is assumed not to be normally
distributed). Some may contend that instead of a poisson regression
analysis, a general negative binomial regression analysis is the more
appropriate model. (It is important to keep in mind that a poisson regression
is a special type of negative binomial regression). I report and discuss the
pluses and minuses of using a negative binomial regression in Appendix D.
For an extensive discussion on the use of these procedures, see, Gary King,
Statistical Models for Political Science Event Counts: Bias in Conventional
Procedures and Evidence for the Exponential Poisson Regression Model,
32 AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 838-863 (1988). For further discussion on this topic,
see, Gary King, Variance Specification in Event Count Models: From
Restrictive Assumptions to a Generalized Estimator, 33 AM. J. OF POL.
SCi.762 (1989); Gary King, A Seemingly Unrelated Poisson Regression
Model, 17 SOC. METHODS & RES. 235 (1989); Gary King & Curtis
Signorino, The Generalization in the Generalized Event Count Model, with
Comments on Achen, Amato, and Londregan, 6 POL. ANALYSIS 225 (1996).
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affect how frequently litigation is used.2 °4 As for assessing the
relative importance of institutional accessibility, I could not
include this in the poisson regression analysis because of the lack
of variation on this variable. I thus assume that institutional
accessibility matters, and consequently I hold this variable con-
stant. In referring back to our earlier discussion, however, it is
clear that this variable alone cannot fully account for whether or
not groups will litigate.
Below table 7 reveals the results of the poisson regression
analysis.
Table 7. Poisson Regression Results on Goals and Resources
(Entries are Poisson Regression
Parentheses)
Coefficients with Standard Errors in
Factors Israel (Coefficients)
Utilitarian (Desire-to-Win) Goal 1.33**** (.22)
Reputation 1.44**** (.18)
Role Fulfillment .24** (. 12)
Donor Satisfaction .54**** (.12)
Publicity .01 (.13)
Resources -.06 (.18)
Constant -7.76**** (.99)
Goodness of Fit chi square 166.53 df= 32, p < 0.00
LR chi square (6) 340.45
p < 0.00
Pseudo R-Square' .62
N 39
*
** -
p<.10
p < .05
p <.0l
p <.001
204 I measure resources by using a blunt measure of this variable-financial
budget. (I obtained the confidential financial data during the interviews. In
some cases leaders even provided me with annual financial reports).
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a Poisson regression does not yield R-squared statistics as seen in typical linear
regression models. The pseudo R-square is provided in order to shed light on the
variance explained. The maximum value of this statistic does not exceed 1.
b The n in table 7 is based on the thirteen different types of users listed in tables
4, 5, and 6 as well as twenty-six groups that were identified as non-users of
litigation. For a discussion of how the groups were selected, see part two.
The results show that the hypotheses made on four of my
five goals are confirmed. However, perhaps most interestingly, the
resource variable is not statistically significant. This finding
supports Yoav Dotan's, position that because the burdens for
entering into the legal process in Israel are low, resources do not
significantly affect whether or not interest groups litigate.205 As for
the individual goals, as predicted, there is a positive relationship
between the utilitarian goal and the frequency of litigation. As the
desire for obtaining policy results via litigation becomes more
important for a group, it will be more likely that the organization
will enter the legal process on an on-going basis.
There is also a positive relationship between the reputation
goal and the frequency of litigation; the more an Israeli interest
group wishes to establish or maintain a reputation for being
involved in litigation, the higher the probability that the organiza-
tion will use litigation as a public policy tool. The hypothesis that
there is a positive relationship between the role fulfillment goal
and the frequency of litigation is confirmed as well. The more
pressure a group feels from partners within its policy network to
fulfill the role of being a litigating organization, the more likely
that group will litigate. Finally, the hypothesis on the donor-
satisfaction goal is confirmed; the more that donor-satisfaction is
valued by Israeli interest groups, the higher the probability that
litigation will be more frequently used as a policy tactic. (The
hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between the
publicity goal and the frequency of litigation is not confirmed in
Israel. Here, the publicity goal is not statistically significant at any
of the levels of significance).
205 Dotan, supra note 7 at 323.
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Clearly, the conditions affecting the decision-calculus of
Israeli interest group leaders are nuanced and complex. Both the
quantitative and qualitative data I provide show that not only do
the goals of interest group leaders matter but that decisions on
whether or not to use the courts are affected by simply more than
resources or institutional factors.
V. CONCLUSION
The sheer increase in the number of women's groups,
environmental groups, and civil liberties/civil rights groups in
Israel is a relatively new phenomenon. The Israeli state still
remains one that is party-dominated, but during the course of the
past two decades the political space has opened for other non
party-based groups to enter. The types of tactics interest groups use
to advance their goals vary both across and within policy sectors.
As we have seen, the tactic of litigation for public interest
organizations, in particular, is used by 44% of women's groups,
13% of environmental groups, and 50% of civil liberties/civil
rights groups.
Several observers contend that litigation by these Israeli
public interest groups continues to increase. It is true that
compared to fifteen years ago more groups are litigating in Israel
today. But as I have shown the standard explanations usually given
for why Israeli groups do or do not litigate are incomplete.
Certainly the fact that groups in Israel have relatively easy access
to courts has facilitated the litigation process for some groups. The
increase in resources groups have seen since the mid-1980s is a
significant development as well. However, as my study indicates,
these two theories alone cannot fully explain when Israeli groups
will and will not select this tactic for social policy purposes.
I have argued throughout this article that aside from
institutional factors and resources, interest group leadership goals
also affect not just if, but how frequently, organizations litigate.
For example, groups that regularly use litigation seriously
contemplate the implications such a decision will have on their
reputation. For those groups that use litigation on a moderate basis,
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donor-concerns play a key role in whether or not organizational-
elites opt for this tactic. And groups that infrequently use litigation
deeply consider the type of publicity that might be gained before
venturing down the legal path.
There are indeed several larger lessons from my findings
on Israeli organizations that should be of interest to those who
study, in particular, American legal mobilization. First, my data
illustrate that there is much more to the decision-making
calculations of elites than external, structural factors or resource-
possession. Rather, the ideas, interests, expectations, and goals of
group-leaders are invaluable to how organizations act and the types
of policies they pursue. Such ideas and goals of leaders serve as
the backbone and life-blood of a group. They shape and influence
how a group is perceived and how it perceives itself. The fact that
groups-Israeli, American, or otherwise-may or may not opt to
participate in litigation may be more reflective of these ideas and
goals of group leaders than any institutional or resource factor.
Second, the study also has potential implications for
American public officials and those in government who interact
with groups on a regular basis. The study provides such officials
with better information on what affects whether or not groups use
the courts as a policy tactic. Government officials who wish
constructively to engage with organized interests-rather than
potentially doing battle with them in court-may be in a better
position to craft or devise policies that foster consensus. As James
Q. Wilson's classic piece reminds us, it is imperative for those in
civil service who work on policies affecting organized interests to
remember that group-leaders face a variety of constraints and
pressures that influence their tactical decisions.
20 6
Finally, this study also has normative implications for a
larger theoretical debate that is currently on-going in the United
States-namely whether or not active legal participation is good
for a society, and for that matter good for democracy. There are
those who decry the tactic of using courts-rather than say the
legislative arena-as a means of achieving public policy
206 James Q. Wilson, The Bureaucracy Problem, 6 PUB. INT.3, 4-9 (1967).
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objectives.20 7 By their nature courts-at least unelected courts-
tend to be institutions that are typically insulated from majoritarian
pressures. Thus judicial decisions that affect public policy have the
potential for being undemocratic in nature. Mary Ann Glendon, for
example, has argued that excessive reliance on lawyers and judicial
policy-making subverts the democratic process. 208 Others too have
repeatedly derided the strategy of using courts as a means to
redress substantive social policy concerns.20 9 To these observers
207 See e.g., Victor Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, & Leach Loaber, Federal
Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Action: A Call for Federal Class
Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform, 37 Harv. J. ON LEGIS.. 483, 507
(2000). (calling, in particular, on class action lawsuit reform and noting that
currently class action lawsuits have the potential for usurping the role of
legislatures).
208 See generally, MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How
THE CRISES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1994).
209 The literature on this subject is vast. For a selected set of noteworthy pieces,
see generally, Kelly Flaherty, Dan Quayle: Lawyers are the Root of All
Social Evil, RECORDER (S.F.), May 20, 1999 at 6; WALTER K. OLSON, THE
LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED
THE LAWSUIT (1991); William Buckley, Invisible Hand Tripped up by
Burden of Lawyer Glut, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct 30, 1991, at A 19.
For a scholar who makes even a larger claim that excessive use of courts
seriously hurts economic productivity, see, Stephen P. Magee, The
Optimum Number of Lawyers: A Reply to Epp, 17 L. & SOC.. INQUIRY 667
(1993). See also, Mancur Olson, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?,
17 L. & SOC.. INQUIRY 625 (1993) (arguing that within a country indeed
there exists an optimal level of lawyers). For those who reject the premises
that lawyers are harmful to society and that there is excessive litigation in
the United States, see, Charles Silver and Frank B. Cross, What's Not to
Like About Being a Lawyer, 109 YALEL. J. 1443 (2000) (reviewing
ARTHUR L. LIMAN, LAWYER: A LIFE OF COUNSEL AND CONTROVERSY
(1998)); Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Images of Lawyers in
Public Opinion, Jokes and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN.. L. REV. 805
(1998); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About
the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 717 (1998); Marc Galanter,
Predators and Parasites: Lawyer Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L.
REv.. 633 (1994); Charles Epp, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?, 17
L. & Soc. INQUIRY 585 (1993); Frank B. Cross, Law versus Economics?,
17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 653 (1993).
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there is a fear of "robed lawyers" becoming super-legislators,
unaccountable in their actions and dangerous to the entire
democratic structure.
And then there is another group of Scholars who believes
that even if results are derived from active legal participation, such
benefits are only marginal. According to this view, irrespective of
how well-reputed, authoritative, or accessible courts are, ultimately
judicial decisions have minimal impact on affecting public policy
or producing social change. 210 These observers argue that courts by
themselves cannot provide direct, tangible rewards to those
seeking redress. Gerald Rosenberg, for example, has urged those
interested in making substantive social change to rely on support
from other institutions that possess both enforcement and financial
powers.
211
Yet, in my view, both these sets of claims are quite limiting
in that they assume obtaining favorable judicial decisions are
somehow the only goal of those who participate in the legal
process. Clearly my findings suggest that groups do not view
participating in the legal process solely in this manner. When it
comes to pursuing action through the courts, the attitudes, ideas,
and goals of group-which I believe, are affected by a combina-
tion of institutional and cultural factors-are varied, subtle, and
much more complex than what is typically noted. Participation
through the legal process can offer new ideas or perspectives to an
issue. Legal participation can help shape public discourse and
frame debates. Furthermore, it can serve as an effective method for
alerting, in the words of David Truman, "potential groups" 212 of
inequities and injustices that exist. Even unfavorable actions by
courts can trigger important legal and non-legal responses by those
at the grassroots level, and such responses can eventually lead to
more fair, equitable, and democratic social policy outcomes.
210 See, Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAw279 (1957)( For a classic discussion
of this argument).
211 See, GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
212 DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 52 (1951).
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Therefore, my evidence leads me to conclude that active
participation in the legal process can be both productive and good
for democracy. For those countries that are making the transition to
democracy and are looking to the United States legal system as a
guide, this lesson is particularly important. As my study has
shown, constructed properly, courts can serve as a key avenue of
political participation for individuals and groups who might
otherwise not be recognized.
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APPENDIX A
For regular users, I conducted a paired samples test in order to
determine whether or not the difference between the most
important goal (reputation) and the rest of the goals cited in figure
2 was statistically significant. Recall that each group interviewed
was asked to rank the five goals in order of importance against one
another. (5 being the most important goal while I was considered
the least important goal). This is referred to as a "repeated
measures design." The correct way to calculate statistical signifi-
cance here is to compute the difference between the rank for each
group, and then to calculate the mean of the difference. (The mean
of the difference was identical to the difference in the means).
Using a paired samples test I then tested the hypothesis that the
mean difference was significantly different from zero using a t-test.
Below table Al provides the results of this test.
Table Al. Paired Differences-Regular Users
Most Important Mean Std. T Score Stat.
Goal (Reputation) Difference Devia- Signifi-
v. Other Goals tion cance
Reputation Goal v.
Utilitarian Goal 1.200 .4472 6.000 .004
Reputation Goal v.
Role Fulfillment 2.000 1.871 2.390 .075
Goal
Reputation Goal v.
Donor Satisfaction 3.000 1.225 5.477 .005
Goal
Reputation Goal v.
Publicity Goal 1.800 1.643 2.449 .070
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Table Al highlights how the difference between the most
important goal for regular users (i.e. reputation) and the rest of the
goals is statistically significant. Statistical significance is present at
a .05 level between the reputation goal and the utilitarian goal and
between the reputation goal and the donor satisfaction goal.
Statistical significance is present at the .10 level between the
reputation goal and the role fulfillment goal and between the
reputation goal and the publicity goal.
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APPENDIX B
For moderate users of litigation, I employ the same type of statis-
tical techniques used in Appendix A. Table B 1 provides the results.
Table B1. Paired Differences-Moderate Users
Most Important Goal Mean Std. T Score Stat.
(Donor Satisfaction) Difference Devia- Signifi-
v. Other Goals tion cance
Donor Satisfaction
Goal & Utilitarian .500 1.732 .577 .604
Goal
Donor Satisfaction
Goal & Reputation 2.250 .957 4.700 .018
Goal
Donor Satisfaction
Goal & Role 2.500 1.291 3.873 .030
Fulfillment Goal
Donor Satisfaction
Goal & Publicity 2.250 1.500 3.000 .058
Goal
In examining the paired sample results regarding the donor
satisfaction goal, we find that in all but one comparison statistical
significance exists between this most important goal and the rest of
the goals. The difference between the donor satisfaction goal and
the utilitarian goal is not statistically significant for Israeli moder-
ate users. The mean score of Israeli moderate users for the donor
satisfaction goal is 4.50, while the mean score for the utilitarian
goal is 4.00. Although the mean scores are numerically different,
statistically there is no significant difference at either the .05 level
or the .10 level. Nevertheless, in the three other comparisons
statistical significance does exist and so the finding cannot be at all
dismissed. The quantitative and qualitative data show that the
wishes and concerns of financial donors are indeed important for
these groups that engage in litigation on a moderate basis.
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APPENDIX C
As with the case of regular and moderate users, a paired samples
test was conducted on all infrequent users in order to determine
whether or not the difference between the most important goal
(publicity) and the rest of the goals cited was statistically signifi-
cant. Table Cl displays the results.
Table C1. Paired Differences-Infrequent Users
Most Important Goal Mean Std. T Stat.
(Publicity) v. Other Difference Devia- Score Signifi-
Goals tion cance
Publicity Goal &
Utilitarian Goal 1.000 2.160 .926 .423
Publicity Goal &
Reputation Goal 1.500 .577 5.196 .014
Publicity Goal & Role
Fulfillment Goal 1.250 2.630 .951 .412
Publicity Goal & Donor
Satisfaction Goal 2.500 1.290 3.873 .030
Table Cl shows that in two of the four comparisons there is
statistical significance. For Israeli infrequent users there is
statistical significance at the .05 level in the difference between the
publicity goal and the reputation goal and between the publicity
goal and the donor satisfaction goal. However, there is no
statistical significance in the difference between the publicity goal
and the utilitarian goal or between the publicity goal and the role
fulfillment goal. How then do we interpret these results? Clearly
the qualitative data from the interviews indicate that for some
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groups the publicity goal is determinative in whether litigation is
selected, and thus the importance of this goal cannot be
overlooked. But as with all good scientific research, perhaps the
safest statement to make is that before we can have complete
confidence on what type of impact this goal has on infrequent
users, more sampling and testing are needed.
Public Interest Litigation
APPENDIX D
As stated in footnote 203, some may argue that the procedure best
suited to determine the relationship between the goals and the
frequency of litigation is to use a negative binomial regression.
Below table D1 reports the results when a negative binomial
regression-rather than a poisson regression-is run on the data.
Table D1. Negative Binomial Regression Results on Goals and
Resources
(Entries are Negative Binomial Regression Coefficients with Standard Errors in
Parentheses)
Factors Israel (Coefficients)
Utilitarian (Desire-to-Win) Goal 1.78*** (.58)
Reputation 1.79*** (.68)
Role Fulfillment .64 (.50)
Donor Satisfaction .63 (.63)
Publicity .78 (.48)
Resources .69 (.53)
Constant -15.19*** (4.95)
LR chi square (6) 30.38 p < 0.00
Pseudo R-Square' .23
ND 39
* = p<. 10
** = p <. 0 5
** = p <.01
= p <.001
a Similar to a poisson regression analysis, a negative binomial regression
analysis does not yield R-squared statistics as seen in typical linear regression
models. The pseudo R-square is provided in order to shed light on the variance
explained. The maximum value of this statistic does not exceed 1.
) The n in table DI is based on the thirteen different types of users listed in
tables 4, 5, and 6 as well as twenty-six groups that were identified as non-users
of litigation. For a discussion of how the groups were selected, see part two.
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From table DI, we see that four of the results are similar to those
reported in the poisson regression table. Like in the poisson
regression table, here, resources are not statistically significant.
Also similar to the poisson regression table, the utilitarian and
reputation goals in the negative binomial table are statistically
significant (although at a .01, rather than a .001 level of
significance). And in both the poisson regression table and table
DI the hypothesis on the publicity goal cannot be confirmed. We
do see differences between the two tables with respect to the role
fulfillment and donor satisfaction goals. In the negative binomial
regression table neither of these two goals are statistically
significant.
Finally, some may contend that the negative binomial
regression table is the correct model to use in this analysis because,
unlike with poisson regression, a negative binomial regression
takes into account both over and under dispersion.213 Yet, as
opposed to poisson regression, with a negative binomial
regression, one loses an extra degree of freedom, and, furthermore,
with the N being only thirty-nine, there is the potential for the
results in table D1 to be considered unstable. Because of the
question over which model is appropriate, I report and present the
findings from both regressions for this study.
213 The "alpha" here (which represents whether dispersion is present) is
statistically significant. However, because the alpha is not significant at the
.001 or .01 level, some may say that the dispersion is minor and thus a
poisson regression model is satisfactory.
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APPENDIX E
(Selected Questions Asked During Interviews)
1. Repeated Measure Design Questions:
(Testing Most Important Goal Hypotheses)
For Users of Litigation:
Can you rank, in order of importance (5 = most important; I -
least important), which of the following affects whether or not
your group litigates?
a. Your group desires to achieve policy objectives
through litigation
b. Your group desires to have a reputation for being a
litigating organization
c. Your groups feels a responsibility to your policy
partners to be a litigating organization
d. Your group feels pressure from donors to litigate
e. Your group desires to publicize a cause through the
legal forum
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II. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS THAT CAN BE CODED AND
THEN MEASURED VIA POISSON REGRESSION
(Testing relationship hypotheses)
-How important is it for your group to achieve your policy
objectives through the tactic of litigation?
A (4).Very important B (3). Important
C (2). Slightly Important D (1). Not Important
-How important is it for your group to have a reputation for being
involved in litigation?
A (4).Very important B (3). Important
C (2). Slightly Important D (1). Not Important
-Is the pressure your group feels from others in your policy
network to litigate a
A (4).Very important B (3). Important
C (2). Slightly Important D (1). Not Important
factor when considering what strategies to use
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-How important is it to your donors that your group engages in
litigation?
A (4). Very important B (3). Important
C (2). Slightly Important D (1). Not Important
- Does the fact that an issue may gain publicity through litigation
play a
A (4).Very important B (3). Important
C (2). Slightly Important D (1). Unimportant
role in whether or not your group uses litigation as a policy tactic?

